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 The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has grown exponentially since 2001.  
This thesis seeks to explore how unmanned aerial vehicles have changed the way in 
which the United States prosecutes its targets.  This is important because misusing 
unmanned aerial vehicles, despite their contributions, risks limiting their use in dangerous 
situations, leaving the mission up to manned aircraft or ground forces.  Case studies of 
UAV use in Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, and Afghanistan were used to analyze three 
hypotheses on the impact of the proliferation and seeming reliance of the United States 
on UAVs.  The first chapter challenges the negative stigmas of UAVs and argues for a 
policy to guide their use.  The chapter addresses the question, is it UAVs that are a 
problem, or is it the implementation of UAVs that are a problem?  Furthermore, this 
chapter establishes UAVs as a natural progression in a technologically superior military.  
The second chapter explores if unmanned aerial vehicles can be used in places like North 
Africa in lieu of ground forces.  The evidence suggests that although UAVs will have 
their utility in Africa, they are still no substitute for human engagement in certain 
circumstances.  The third chapter addresses if unmanned aerial vehicles can support both 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.  The evidence reviewed in this 
chapter proposes drones can support either mission, but the mission needs to be clear and 
unambiguous enough to ensure the use of force is consistent with the strategic objectives 
of the war.  In either type of mission, the role of the UAV has to be consistent with the 
principles the overall mission is trying to achieve.  As a natural progression of a 
technologically superior military, UAVs have proven to be a reliable and dependable 
intelligence collection platform with a strike capability, but they are no substitute for 
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human engagement on the ground and require a clear and unambiguous mission to guide 
the use of force by the unmanned system. 
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 The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs” or “drones” to many) has grown 
exponentially since 2001.1  This thesis seeks to explore how unmanned aerial vehicles 
have changed the way in which the United States prosecutes its targets.  In short, this 
thesis surmises that the technological advantages of drones to target adversaries causes 
their use and, in some instances, overuse.  Some claim, such as P.W. Singer, the 
decreased risk to humans and the ease with which a target can be engaged, changes the 
calculus in deciding when and where to conduct a war-like act.  Consequently, the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles should be done in accordance with a transparent policy guiding 
its use.  Furthermore, the use of force applied from drones should be consistent with the 
overall strategies of the United States.  This is important to explore because misusing 
unmanned aerial vehicles, despite their contributions, risks limiting their use in situations 
dangerous to ground forces and manned aircraft in future engagements. 
 Leveraging all aspects of national power to protect the security of the United 
States is a mainstay of the last two presidential administrations.  Drones have facilitated 
an aggressive strategy to target adversaries in austere and under-governed countries 
without risking the lives of human pilots and without using combat ground forces in some 
areas.  The chapters of this thesis dissect how UAVs have changed the way in which the 
United States prosecutes its targets as such: (1) is it UAVs that are a problem, or is it the 
implementation of UAVs that are a problem, (2) can drones be used in places like North 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This thesis does not address autonomous systems.  When referring to drones, this thesis is talking about 
remotely piloted unmanned aerial vehicles.  The decisions to engage enemy fighters are still made by 
humans. 
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Africa in lieu of ground forces, and (3) are drones better suited for counterinsurgency 
(COIN) or counterterrorism (CT) operations.   
 These three topics were chosen to compliment one another in the following 
manner.  The evidence suggests UAVs are a natural progression of a technologically 
superior military, and the responsible party for any wrongdoing is from the humans 
operating the UAV; therefore, a transparent policy should guide its use to ensure the 
reputation of UAVs is not completely negative.  In other words, if drones are being used 
in accordance with a transparent policy guiding their use, and drones are still being 
misused, it may be easier to hold a human responsible for their misuse, rather than 
placing blame on a UAV.  As drone technology proliferates and UAVs become 
increasingly relied upon, exploring their use in lieu of ground forces in places like North 
Africa is an appropriate next step.  Concluding that UAVs will not completely replace the 
importance of human engagement on the ground, determining the role of UAVs in 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (arguably the two primary military 
operations being conducted at the time of this writing) is a logical next step for the final 
chapter.  The last chapter reiterates earlier arguments that a clear mission must be 
identified in order to ensure the effective military utility of UAVs.  A clear mission, 
coupled with a transparent policy guiding the use of UAVs, provides appropriate 
guidelines for the use of force in achieving the strategic objectives of the United States, 
and preserving the reputation of drones as an invaluable asset instead of a liability fueling 
an insurgency or increasing the ranks of a terrorist organization. 
 Chapter One challenges the negative connotations of UAVs and argues for a 
transparent policy to guide their use.  The chapter addresses the question, is it UAVs that 
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are a problem, or is it the implementation of UAVs that are a problem?  The evidence 
suggests that it is the implementation that is a problem, and not the UAVs 
themselves.  UAVs are simply a tool in a toolbox.  Furthermore, this chapter establishes 
UAVs as a natural progression in a technologically superior military and argues for a 
more transparent policy to guide the use of drones, and more specifically armed drones.  
A case study of armed drones in Yemen was chosen to explore their role outside the 
traditional battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Supported with empirical evidence of 
drones being used since the early to mid- Twentieth century, the case study also reviews 
the targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki.  Yemen is the host to numerous drone strikes and the 
targeting of an American citizen, which is what makes this case study so appropriate. 
 A secondary question posed is whether the use of UAVs is defining the warfare 
strategy, or vice versa.  In other words, are the goals of a conflict based on the potential 
to achieve them via UAVs?  This chapter argues that United States policy should instead 
define the strategy (which may or may not include some usage of UAVs, depending on 
the circumstances).  The central argument behind UAVs defining the strategy is because 
drones make it easier to conduct war-like acts.  Removing the risk to a human has 
changed the calculus in deciding how and when the use of force is applied.  This is 
important to review because, for the most part, it is here where drones begin to receive 
their notoriety.  The essence of the argument is, just because a target can be attacked, 
does not mean the target should be attacked.  Therefore, it stands to reason that drones, a 
natural progression of a technologically superior military, require a transparent policy to 
ensure their use is consistent with the goals of the United States and that the weapon 
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system is a tool with which to use in, but not guide, the strategy in pursuing the 
adversaries of the United States. 
  Chapter Two explores if unmanned aerial vehicles can be used in places like 
North Africa in lieu of ground forces.  A case study on Mali was contrasted with military 
operations in Somalia and Libya to examine the role of unmanned systems and ground 
forces.  The evidence suggests that despite the proliferation of UAV use, and although 
UAVs have their utility in Africa, they are still no substitute for human engagement in 
certain circumstances.2  North Africa was chosen because at the time of this writing the 
United States was providing French and Malian forces with unarmed UAV support to 
combat al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, among others, from gaining 
control of Northern Mali.  Although UAV support in Mali seemed to be an ideal level of 
support at the time, and despite the seemingly limitless potential for drones in the vast 
and open North African deserts, they do not appear to be able take the place of ground 
forces.  In order to effect real change in Africa, it is argued that African countries 
themselves will have to be better trained and prepared to prevent nefarious groups from 
entering their sovereign countries in the first place.  This level of support requires a 
focused and deliberate strategic plan.  Nevertheless, when it comes to combating terrorist 
groups that are already present, drones provide the United States the ability to do so 
without risking the lives of its service members. 
 By contrast, as the numerous missions in Africa have shown - such as withdrawal 
of United States Navy SEALs in an attempted amphibious landing in Somalia, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is not to imply an argument that drones will take over all military operations, but rather to highlight 
that drones have to be part of an overall operational picture.  However, as discussed in subsequent sections, 
some make the argument that drones are the only means available to target individuals in hard to reach 
places. 
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successful capture of a Libyan militant in Tripoli - there is no substitute for boots on the 
ground when the target or the environment is not conducive to a drone strike.  To be sure, 
the same can be said for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in Pakistan.  Government 
officials have claimed drones are the only successful method to attack targets in Pakistan, 
yet ground forces were used to target Osama bin Laden.  Despite the technical prowess of 
drones, the evidence suggests ground forces are still looked upon as an essential element 
in conducting military missions. 
 Chapter Three addresses if unmanned aerial vehicles can support both 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.  As some conflate the meaning of 
these two disparate terms, drone use seems to be held culpable for making it difficult to 
achieve success of one type of mission while trying to achieve success in the other.  A 
case study of drone strikes in Pakistan is contrasted with their use in supporting missions 
in Yemen and Afghanistan.  These were chosen because of the complex nature in 
identifying the most applicable approach to defeating adversaries in these countries.  
Afghanistan presents a fairly clear counterinsurgency mission; Yemen is the host of an 
aggressive counterterrorism strategy; while, the case in Pakistan seems to be more fitting 
of a counterterrorism approach, yet criticized for things more befitting of a 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Regardless, the evidence reviewed in this chapter proposes 
drones can support either mission, as long as the mission is clear and unambiguous 
enough to ensure the use of force is consistent with the strategic objectives of the war.  In 
other words, UAVs can be used to support either type of mission, but the role of the UAV 
has to be consistent with the principles the overall mission is trying to achieve. 
	   6	  
 Drones facilitate the ease with which a target can be engaged.  For that reason it is 
important to understand under what type of mission a particular target is being engaged – 
COIN or CT.  A potential target under COIN operations may need more fidelity on the 
exact individual and require a study of the second and third order effects before being 
engaged.  By contrast, under a CT mission, target fidelity may not be as important 
provided the physical descriptions are consistent with nefarious activity.  This is 
important to explore because the effects of one mission may be counterproductive to the 
goals of the other mission. 
 Just as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are an asymmetric method of warfare 
from an adversary with a dearth of traditional “resource power,” drones are an 
asymmetric method of exploiting an enemy’s weakness in aerial defense.3  On the other 
hand, Andrew Mack cautions against thinking industrial power alone facilitates inevitable 
victory.  Mack posits, “in essence, the actor with the most resolve wins, regardless of 
material power resources.”4  Although unmanned aerial vehicles provide a marked 
advantage on the battlefield, their short-term gains may have long-term costs if not 
applied appropriately.  In other words, drones may be looked upon as a method to engage 
a target because of the ease with which a target can be attacked, but if their use 
perpetuates conflict, their benefits may be counterproductive.  Furthermore, if drones 
carry the burden of being heavily criticized for collateral damage and an invasion of civil 
rights or state sovereignty, that could negatively impact the resolve to prosecute the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Andrew Mack. "Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric conflict." World Politics 27, 
no. 02 (1975): 182. 
4 Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict." International Security 
26, no. 1 (2001): 95. 
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enemies of the United States seeking refuge in under-governed safe havens.  To that end, 
ensuring drones are used smartly can secure their use in future engagements. 
  








 The landscape of the battlefield has changed significantly in the last decade.  
Transformations can be seen across the services from military uniforms to the frequency 
and method of communication with loved ones back home.  Perhaps the most drastic 
changes can be seen with the weapons used.  Unmanned aerial vehicles are a symbol of 
the technological advancements on the battlefield to support ground forces, and a symbol 
of the lurking American presence for those on the run.  As the United States continues 
retrograde operations in Afghanistan, many Americans look forward to the safe return of 
the American forces; there should also be support for the role drones played in the war.  
This is important because drones will likely play a significant part in the future of 
military operations – on the battlefield and in humanitarian assistance.  Leaving 
Afghanistan with drones burdened with a negative connotation, may present challenges in 
their use in future engagements. 
 This chapter seeks to explore if it is the UAV that is the problem, or if the 
implementation of UAVs is the problem.  Drones have undoubtedly changed the way the 
United States prosecutes its targets.  They provide decision makers with an 
unprecedented range of options, from providing real-time footage of an objective, to 
providing hours upon hours of close air support for ground troops, and perhaps most 
controversially, to attacking targets in sovereign nations – all while removing the risk to a 
human pilot.  Critics of drones make some compelling arguments, but further research is 
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needed to differentiate between conjecture and key analytic judgments based on 
evidence.  The arguments against their use range from being less than honorable, to 
fueling an insurgency.  Rand Paul even goes as far as arguing they could be used to target 
Americans in the United States.5  This claim however was abruptly refuted by the Obama 
Administration in a letter to the Senator stating drones would not be used to kill 
Americans within the United States.6  Ultimately, this is a policy question on how drones 
should be used and not necessarily an attack on the unmanned technology.  The argument 
ought to be to define a policy guiding the use of drones – not that drones make it too easy 
to conduct acts of war or violate basic human rights.  Unmanned aerial vehicles may be 
the lynch pin to success in key humanitarian missions, as well as dangerous missions 
covering chemical and biological warfare, and therefore it is essential to ensure their 
reputation remains intact, as free of negative connotations as possible.  This chapter 
attempts to counter the negative arguments against drones and if the theory is true, it 
expects to support their evolution as a necessary implement of a technologically superior 
military. 
 While many speak of drones with condescending undertones, this chapter argues 
to embrace the role of unmanned aerial systems.7  The uses of drones for humanitarian 
missions are not as eagerly contested as they are in a combat role.  The only issues seem 
to arise when drones are loaded with weapons to kill an enemy.  On the other hand, that is 
the very crux of the opponent’s argument – too many are killed when a drone strikes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Jeremy Herb and Justin Sink. “Obama faces turning point on administration drone policy,” The Hill, 
March 8, 2013. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Unmanned Aerial Systems generally refer to multiple aircraft, a ground control station, a satellite link, 
spare equipment, and personnel to maintain and operate the aircraft.	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There is some validity to that argument, but it is not the drones, it is the policy allowing 
the use of the drones. 
 In order to understand how the use of drone strikes incites such objections, the 
relationship between the cause and effect variables must be looked at more closely.  In 
other words, the overuse of drones precipitates a bad reputation by targeting terrorist 
suspects at all levels of hierarchy and in sovereign nations outside traditional battlefields.  
The independent variable is the use of drones in armed combat engaging an enemy target, 
while the explanatory variable is the bad reputation drones receive, as well as questions 
on the legality of their use.  The causal relationship between its use and its reputation is 
explored in greater detail in the following pages. 
 This chapter is divided into four sections.  First, the literature review examines the 
pros and cons of drones as presented in the current literature and begins to explore the 
causal relationship of drone use and its level of support for use.  Second, to highlight 
recent successes and implications of drone activity, a case study reveals the nuances of 
their use - their application in Yemen.  Additionally, the case study includes empirical 
evidence supporting the claim that the use of drones is a natural progression in the 
development of military technology and therefore should take its place as a legitimate 
tool in the arsenal of the military capabilities.  Third, the analysis section provides a 
thorough review of the critical comments and reflects on the natural progression of the 
drones into the battlefield.  Lastly, this chapter concludes with a summary of the points 
made and questions to guide further research. 
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Literature Review 
 Generally speaking, unmanned aerial vehicles are multi-mission, multi-purpose 
vehicles, uninhibited by fatigue, or other limiting human factors.  They have been used 
since the mid- to late twentieth century, although their use has proliferated significantly 
since 2001.  While they possess many capabilities and provide many benefits, they also 
provide a layer of protection to humans clouded with mismanagement and overuse.  This 
layer of protection has the potential to manifest itself in choosing to use a drone since the 
risk to a pilot is removed.8  As explained in current literature, the simple fact of reducing 
the risk to human life may not be worth the liberties the United States takes when using 
an unmanned aerial vehicle to target a suspect.  On the other hand, there are many 
supporters of drones as they provide the ability to pursue targets seeking refuge in austere 
and dangerous environments. 
 
Against the Drone Or For the Drone 
 The application of armed drone use is what really seems to fuel the distaste for 
drones.  The targeted killings are even referred to as extrajudicial or assassinations.  
Philip Alston, of the United Nations, raised serious concerns over the use of drone strikes 
and challenged the legality of the United States’ drone program after an accidental attack 
killed twenty-three civilians.9  Andrew Exum and Medea Benjamin go as far as asserting 
UAVs are immoral, and question the honorable nature of drones.  However that language 
is not nearly as strong when manned fixed-wing aircraft are used to drop bombs two, 
three, or even four times the size of the precision guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun. "The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition." Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 03 (2011): 337. 
9 Brunstetter and Braun, 341. 
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by the Predator and its larger version, the Reaper.10  Further inciting angst, is the 
targeting of suspected terrorists outside traditional battlefields in sovereign nations, such 
as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia; however, the United States government maintains their 
use is only when endorsed by the host government.11  A central theme of the argument 
against drones outside battlefields can be seen in Rand Paul’s leap to assert the 
proliferation of drone use will know no boundaries and, therefore, target American 
citizens on United States’ soil.12  The issue for many is that drones, because of their ease 
of use, are used too frequently abroad and cause too many civilian casualties.  The 
argument is essentially that, due to their frequent use, drones are claiming too many 
innocent lives, which in a war of insurgents drives more toward the insurgency.13  As the 
number of insurgents increase, the number of drone strikes increase.  This self-
perpetuating vicious cycle has no end in sight as each of the newly joined insurgents is 
targeted under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).14 
 Questioning the morality or claiming drones are a less than honorable way to fight 
is an intriguing position.  Exum and Benjamin argue against the merits of even using 
drones.  Exum, whose argument rests on the theory that collateral damage is the catalyst 
that causes many uncommitted to join an insurgency, opines from a "classical" 
perspective that unmanned aerial vehicles are not an honorable way to fight.15  A frequent 
co-author of his, Kilcullen takes this a step further and posits they are "counterproductive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheets, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, accessed 4 March 2013. 
11 David Sanger. Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. 
Broadway, 2012, 258. 
12 Herb and Sink. “Obama faces turning point on administration drone policy.” 
13 Jane Mayer. "The predator war." The New Yorker 85 (2009). 
14 The Authorization for Use of Military Force was passed in the weeks after the attacks against the United 
States on September 11, 2001.  It provides the authorization to target those responsible for the attacks.  
(Con., 107th, 2001, S. J. RES. 23.).  The definition of the adversary as an insurgent is explored in greater 
detail in Chapter Three. 
15 Jane Mayer. "The predator war." 
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because they stoke anger against the United States."16  In developing a counterinsurgency 
strategy the misuse of any weapon system will have debilitating effects.  Whether or not 
the use of a weapon system is honorable, is an argument not taken by too many.  
Benjamin on the other hand, as a peace activist, projects much of her disdain against the 
wars and the collateral damage caused by drones.  Unlike Exum and Kilcullen, her 
argument is not to build a stronger more effective counterinsurgency, but rather to engage 
the enemy with dialogue and diplomacy.17  However, she lends credence to Exum's 
questioning the honorable nature of drones by emphasizing the honorable nature of 
Pashtun fighters. 
 To further complicate the use of drones, some argue the reduced risk to humans 
has changed the calculus in deciding when to strike a target.  This is Brunstetter and 
Braun’s argument of “jus in bello” meaning just because they can be targeted, does not 
justify the act.18  While opponents argue the legalities of targeting outside a battlefield, 
and in some instances an American citizen, Diederik Kolff argues, “For as long as one is 
willing to define Al-Qaeda as trained combatants that have declared war against the 
United States, they are legitimate targets in this global war against terrorism.”19  In 
contrast, Mary Ellen O’Connell, however, balances her position in supporting the use of 
drone strikes in a combat zone, but not in areas outside a defined battlefield.  Her position 
is that since war was not declared on the host nation, and using armed drones to attack a 
target constitutes “military force,” these forms of attack can be interpreted as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann. "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the US Drone 
Programs in Pakistan." Foreign Aff. 90 (2011): 14. 
17 Medea Benjamin. "Drone warfare: Killing by remote control." (2012), 201. 
18 Brunstetter and Braun, 337. 
19 Diederik Kolff. 2003. "'Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni Cooperation'--Using UCAVs to Kill 
Alleged Terrorists: A Professional Approach to the Normative Bases of Military Ethics." Journal Of 
Military Ethics 2, no. 3: 243. 
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“extrajudicial killings.”20  This position is ostensibly so as not to impose on the 




 Drones provide a way to surgically enter a sovereign nation and attack al-Qaeda 
seeking refuge without sending in an armed ground force, a far more overt form of 
military force.  As the arguments mount against drones citing their influence in the 
expansion of the AUMF, it is important to remember that technological advancements 
have secured the United States’ position as a global superpower.  While many may not 
have been able to project exactly the extent of their impact, UAVs have been a part of 
future plans for decades. 
 These types of technological advancements in weapons systems and military 
vehicles can be seen throughout history.  Kolff makes his argument supporting the use of 
UAVs.  Kolff asserts that while drone use could benefit from political oversight, drones 
should continue to be used in military engagements.21  He further argues, "rightfully or 
wrongfully, a series of significant military innovations have facilitated and upheld 
Western global dominance since the fifteenth century."22  While Kolff favors the 
continued use of drones, he does so with a hint of caution not to overuse drones simply 
because it is easy.  This is similar to Glade’s complimentary projection in how UAVs 
should be brought into the military arsenal.  Specifically, Kolff focuses on weapons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Rise of Drones II: Examining the 
Legality of Unmanned Targeting, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, 20. 
21 Kolff, 243. 
22 Ibid., 241. 
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systems technologies, such as "bronze gunpowder artillery" and "thermonuclear 
weapons," and vehicles, such as submarines and aircraft.23  All of these have played in 
important role in overwhelming enemy forces to defeat.  Kolff states, "military 
innovations formed a change in combat that created a serious disadvantage for those 
armed forces that did not adopt them."24  However, there is an element of caution in 
applying the use of force, albeit from a technologically superior military, because, in the 
words of Andrew Mack, “not only does superiority in military force not guarantee 
victory; it may, under certain circumstances, be positively counter-productive.”25  In 
other words, just because drones offer a tactical advantage, if used incorrectly, they have 
the potential to be a liability.  As the United States continues to develop its weapons 
systems to fight an increasingly difficult enemy to fight with conventional forces, 
unconventional methods should be leveraged to secure victory.  Drones have the ability 
to provide this capability if used properly. 
Glade, in his July 2000 report on unmanned aerial vehicles, offers his perspective 
of the inevitable use of drones in the coming years.  His timely insight on how UAVs 
might be used and their benefits in future conflicts is rather consistent with the arguments 
taken today.  Unmanned aerial vehicles, for obvious reasons, do save the lives of pilots 
and should be used for the more dangerous missions.  Dangerous missions could mean 
physical danger to the aircraft or politically as well.  Brunstetter and Braun state, “drones 
can serve as a coercive measure short of full-scale war.”26  This very line of thinking 
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precipitates the use of drones in sovereign nations such as Yemen and Pakistan, to some 
extent. 
However, Glade, as well as Brunstetter and Braun, caution that the absence of a 
human to make the last minute judgment call to avoid collateral damage is a pitfall of 
drones.  Glade argues from the pilot’s perspective without a human there to hear and see 
what is going on in and around the aircraft, effects can be lost on a remote pilot that may 
alter the judgment of engaging a target.  Brunstetter and Braun make a similar claim 
indicating that the physical distance between the pilot and the aircraft could lend to 
erroneously engaging targets because of their lack of “accompanying situational 
awareness.”27  These arguments are certainly compelling enough to demand attention, but 
alone, will not likely cause significant change to drone policies.  Given the high 
resolution and advanced surveillance equipment in drones, it would be difficult to 
contend that a pilot at elevation and speed can make a better determination of the ground 
situation. 
 
Drone Policies and War-like Acts 
Micah Zenko is one of those making the case for a stronger and more transparent 
drone policy.  A change in policy or even to declare what is the policy would likely 
assuage the concerns of many, but the lack of transparency has scholars, such as Zenko 
and Banks, among others, calling for a reformed policy.  Zenko outlines his policy 
objectives in his Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies.28  Among his recommendations 
for adjusting policies guiding the use of drones is that the President should restrict the use 
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of drone strikes to only al-Qaeda senior leadership or individuals known to be part of an 
operation against the United States or its allies, that Congress should be briefed more on 
the role of drones to ensure they are aligned with foreign policy objectives, and that the 
United States should play a larger role in outreach to other nations aspiring to build 
drones to share best practices and establish a safe proliferation of unmanned 
technology.29  Ensuring greater oversight by elected officials may very well have its 
advantages to saving the reputation of drones, but too much bureaucracy could slow the 
program down and marginalize its effectiveness. 
While acknowledging the need for a stated policy, and sensitive to the amount of 
time it would take to approve each case, Banks argues for a policy to guide the desired 
end-state.  He states, "Congress should better articulate the policy objectives we are 
trying to achieve, it's not possible for Congress to deliberate about every individual drone 
strike, but they should set policy for what we seek to achieve in using force."30  This is 
consistent with Zenko's recommendation for increased oversight to ensure foreign policy 
milestones are not hampered by the use of drone strikes - or misuse, as they would assert. 
 Like Brunstetter and Braun, Kolff tackles the "Just War" theory.  The theory 
explores jus ad bellum (right to start a war), and jus in bello (rights in war).31  These 
dynamics are important to the discussion of UAVs because they provide the distinction 
between the use of UAVs in war and going to war because it is possible.  Kolff highlights 
that the use of unmanned aerial vehicles provides an opportunity to make war-like acts, 
such as targeting an individual, without actually going to war.  This means that if the 
objective of the aggressor is to kill an individual, this can be accomplished without 
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having to invade a country with ground forces.  Although, opponents, like O’Connell, 
argue that the use of drones in any sovereign nation, without its consent, is an affront to 
its sovereignty and therefore an act of war.  However, Kolff argues, "weapon platforms 
themselves do not bring ethical dilemmas, their use does."32  The drone is simply the 
delivery vehicle, or the instrument of a government pursuing its enemies, regardless of 
their location.  The hazard in this theory is succinctly described by Kolff, "the danger 
might be a lowered threshold that is felt by the leadership, as they will send machines to 
war, not humans."33  The implication being that political leaders will be more likely to 
use lethal force as the risks of losing a human are removed and an overuse of this policy 
will prove to undermine its effectiveness. 
 The existing literature makes strong claims that the current drone policy, or lack 
thereof, cannot continue on its current course.  Change must occur to both safeguard the 
future use of this innovative weapon system and to prevent the United States from 
engaging one target after the next with no end in sight, and each with diminishing returns. 
This is a relative constant among the arguments thus far.  Bergen and Tiedemann 
present the most lucid argument for a revised drone policy, while Zenko presents the 
most comprehensive set of recommendations for a policy.  Mayer takes the argument a 
bit further by endorsing an argument that asserts drone strikes are less than honorable.  
Whether or not these policies need the revision some call for, like Mayer and Zenko, they 
are having a significant impact on both sides of the battlefield.  On the other hand, 
Brunstetter and Braun set out to determine if that impact is “just.”  They proclaim, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Kolff, 243. 
33 Ibid., 244.	  
	   19	  
because something can be done, does not mean it should be done, which is seemingly 
taking the side of Mayer by questioning the morality of drone strikes. 
Mayer, Bergen and Tiedemann, and Zenko each offers an acknowledgment of the 
effects drones are having on the enemy – a far more measurable effect.  The enemy is 
adapting its tactics, techniques, and procedures to avoid detection of these lurking icons 
of technological superiority.  This impact should not be over looked, nor underplayed.  
As former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated of drones, “it’s the only game in 
town.”34  Contrary to what Brunstetter and Braun argue, in this case, because drones can 
be used to target, they should. 
On the other hand, Singer cautions readers that American technological 
superiority alone will not win the war in Afghanistan.35  His references come from a 
number of military officers that question the optimism on the role of the UAV.  Therein 
lies the issue.  The role of the UAV should not, much like any other single weapon 
system, be to win the war by itself.  It should be an implement of war, not a means to an 
end.  Singer spares no page claiming the successes of IEDs, a rudimentary technology 
comparatively speaking, are having on coalition forces.  If anything, that reason alone 
should support taking to the sky.  As night vision devices provide a marked advantage 
over an enemy, so too do UAVs.  And as such UAVs should play an integral role in 
tactical mission planning.  Night vision devices do not win wars, nor do UAVs; they 
provide an advantage to winning battles set forth to achieve strategic objectives. 
An opponent to the current application of drones, Singer further argues that the 
calculus has changed.  He asserts since we no longer have mechanisms in place that 
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stretch the sacrifices of war over the entire population, such as a draft, war bonds, and 
war taxes, and since we do not declare war, drones provide the United States the 
opportunity to conduct attacks that would seemingly be acts of war, with little to no 
recourse.36  The decisions to wage war and attack a target are no longer subject to heavy 
scrutiny when the risk to humans is removed from the equation.  Persky takes this one 
step further and states, "war has become so easy that we no longer understand when we 
are conducting a war-like maneuver."37  These are serious concerns when considering the 
current, and previous, administration’s application of the AUMF.  Without the constraints 
of geography and time, drones present a dangerous proposition to government leaders 
pursuing those responsible for the attacks against the United States. 
The arguments presented in this section explore the causal relationship of going to 
war, or conducting war-like attacks, because drones make it easy.  Drones are a natural 
progression of the military and its guiding policies should provide the necessary 
constraints of its application.  For while the current successes of drones on the battlefield 
in defeating an enemy and degrading their freedom of movement is highly regarded, they 
have also experienced criticism for their collateral damage.  More evidence is needed to 
fully understand the correlation between the use of drones and its impact on the 
insurgency; both in terms of degrading an insurgent’s network and on the ability for an 
insurgency to recruit.38 
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Case Study 
 The specific case study that provides context to this argument is the use of drones 
in targeting Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.  This case represents its own set of issues and 
complexities that highlight the reliance on technology to prosecute targets because of the 
ease with which these unmanned aerial vehicles provide.  A sovereign nation outside the 
traditional battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, Yemen was chosen because of its unique 
characteristics – it has been host to numerous drone strikes and the targeting of an 
American citizen.  These two characteristics make the comparison so appropriate.  Many 
opponents to the use of drones cite examples of extrajudicial killings and that drones 
make it easy to kill, even if the targets are American.  It is thus here, where drones may 
have started to receive much of their notoriety.  There are authors, such as Benjamin, who 
detest their use in any part of the globe, but many cite fueling an insurgency in Pakistan 
and the extrajudicial killings in Somalia and Yemen as the crux of their argument.  There 
is even more talk about their use in Pakistan, but given the geographical relationship to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections and 
Chapter Three. 
 In pursuit of those responsible for the attacks against the United States in 2001, 
Congress provided the Authorization for Use of Military Force in the following days.  
Under these auspices, the president is privileged to "use all necessary and appropriate 
force" against anyone providing a role in the acts, safe haven, or any level of support to 
al-Qaeda.39  With no limitations to time and distance, the United States seeks justice for 
those who took part in attacking the United States.  From 2001 until the time of this 
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writing, Yemen has been the host to nearly 104 airstrikes.40  These attacks have inspired 
two distinct arguments as a result - conducting an attack in a sovereign nation outside the 
traditional battlefield, and targeting an American.  While this thesis does not get into the 
details of targeting an American citizen, as that is another topic in and of itself, it would 
be negligent not to address its importance as it relates to the use of drones.  Targeting an 
American citizen in any fashion, manned or unmanned aerial vehicle or through the use 
of direct action, has much more to do with violating constitutionally protected civil rights 
afforded to the citizens of the United States than it does with the application of drones.  In 
other words, there is no correlation between the constitutionality of targeting an 
American and drone use. 
 
Targeting al-Qaeda in Yemen 
 As those responsible for the attacks against the United States sought refuge, the 
United States followed.  After losing much of their sanctuary in Afghanistan in 2001, 
Yemen became a place of refuge for al-Qaeda.41  In November 2002, a Predator drone 
targeted Qaed Salim Sinyan, among other al-Qaeda members.  Sinyan was a key 
facilitator in the USS Cole bombing and a close ally of Osama bin Laden.42  In lieu of 
exposing ground forces to the risk of combat, and occupying another country, drones 
became a candidate for conducting attacks. 
 Most notably is the case against Anwar al-Awlaki.  Awlaki was an American 
citizen and senior al-Qaeda member.  In September 2011, Awlaki was the subject of a 
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drone strike, which killed him and several others, including another American.43  The 
immediate backlash from the targeting and killing of an American put the United States 
Government on the defensive.  The Defense Department took the position claiming, 
"belligerents who happen to be U.S. citizens do not enjoy immunity where non-citizen 
belligerents are valid military objectives."44  The fact that al-Awlaki was killed without a 
trial is what causes many civil rights groups to challenge the legality of the attack.  They 
claim his fifth and fourteenth amendments were directly violated and he should have had 
a trial.45  In response former Attorney General Holder states, "a careful and thorough 
executive branch review of the facts in a case amounts to due process."46  Holder’s claim 
at least indicates support of providing some level of due process.  On the other hand, it 
appears the State Department is content on denying due process because it appears they 
view Awlaki only as a terrorist.  The State Department’s former senior attorney, Harold 
Koh, argues, terrorists are not obliged a legal process prior to lethal force.47  Even still, 
Senators Rand Paul and Jeff Sessions are not convinced.  Post Rand Paul’s filibuster in 
early March 2013, they maintain the President does not have the ability to deprive an 
American, albeit an al-Qaeda operative, due process.48 
 Opponents of the use of drones in other countries adjust their argument to make it 
sound as if drones took off from Nevada and flew into the airspace of a sovereign nation, 
killed its inhabitants, and reported back home with impunity.  Indeed, as Waxman asserts, 
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over the years, and two different administrations, the United States has been in a war with 
al-Qaeda, with no boundaries.49  In this case, the drones were coming from a small group 
of coalition forces located in Djibouti to attack targets across the Gulf of Aden in 
Yemen.50  The small group of forces there forms the base of operations to target al-Qaeda 
in the area.  As the Yemeni government finds itself in constant struggle with terrorists, 
namely al-Qaeda, a partnership has been formed to target the aggressors of the both 
states.  Although, not confirmed, Hasik hints at the witting complicity of the Yemeni 
government.51 
 Coming under immense scrutiny of targeting an American citizen, former 
Attorney General Holder argues the justification of the use of drones.  He states, 
"whether the capture of a U.S.-citizen terrorist is feasible is a fact-specific, and 
potentially time-sensitive, question.”52  Once Awlaki was confirmed in a specific 
location, the window to target him was likely only minutes.  Armed with state-of-art 
surveillance equipment and Hellfire missiles, with an ability to travel hundreds of miles 
while providing an element of surprise, drones were a likely choice in prosecuting 
Awlaki as a target.  The target was justifiable in the eyes of the United States, and the 
weapon of choice was within the construct of law-of-war principles, as described by 
Holder.53  The alternatives would be to use a manned aircraft, placing risk to a pilot; 
using armed forces, placing risk to soldiers on the ground engaging in armed combat; or 
letting him go, placing greater risk to Americans abroad or in the United States.  Drones 
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were able to achieve success while eliminating risk to humans in combat.  Whether or not 
one agrees with targeting an American terrorist or flying the mission in a sovereign land, 
the unmanned aerial vehicle provided the safest way to eliminate the threat to the United 
States - an aim the current presidential administration seems to have a penchant to 
leverage. 
 According to the Long War Journal, the drone strike in 2002 was the only one 
recorded until 2009.54  Indeed there is a significant increase in drone strikes since the 
Obama administration took office.  Drone strikes have increased five fold in some 
instances.  There are potentially numerous attributable factors for this increase such as 
surge in coalition forces, a greater number of targets either through decreased operational 
security by terrorists or increased vigilance by Coalition forces, or an increased desire to 
reduce the risk to manned operations.  Regardless, what is for certain is that the use of 
drones does not seem to be going away.   
 
Evolution of Drone Technology 
Controversy aside, drones have changed the landscape of the battlefield.  The long 
duration of drones conducting surveillance operations avoids the complications of 
previous state-of-the-art aircraft such as the U-2.55  This capability coupled with an attack 
mode makes drones an all-in-one aircraft, ready for any situation.  These technological 
advancements are not uncommon to the United States military, but rather a natural 
progression in the advancement of weapons systems. 
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In fact the military is always seeking innovative ways to secure its global 
dominance.  While developing ways to expand the capabilities of United States Army 
attack aviation, in 1998 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Madden wrote on developing an 
"Army Aviation Strike Force."56  LTC Madden's plan centered on providing leadership 
with a more comprehensive set of solutions to highly complex threats around the world.  
In doing so it meant creating a strike force with specific capabilities.  Much like can be 
seen in the current UAV systems today, LTC Madden focused on two distinct capabilities 
- attack and reconnaissance. 
In his plan, LTC Madden wanted to increase the lethality of the AH-64 Apache by 
increasing its survivability in inclement weather and developing a self-sufficient weapon 
system.  A more sophisticated radar system provides better protection against threats, 
such as enemy fire and inclement weather.  Developing the AGM-114 Hellfire missile 
into a "fire-and-forget" missile means the aircraft can launch a missile and immediately 
seek cover, thereby protecting itself from retaliatory fire.57  Advanced radars coupled 
with a more tactically oriented missile, increases the lethality and survivability of an 
aircraft exponentially - manned or unmanned. 
The Apache's reconnaissance partner, the RAH-66 Stealth Warrior, was upgraded 
with target acquisition, "near-real time" observation of the battlefield, and 
communications equipment.58  These upgrades made it the perfect complement for the 
Apache and particularly, with the observation of the battlefield, ground forces.  But 
Madden's picture of the perfect aviation strike force did not stop here.  Unmanned Aerial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Craig Madden. Army Aviation Strike Force: A New Strategic Asset for the 21st Century. Army War 
College, 1998, 1.	  
57 Madden, 6. 
58 Ibid., 10. 
	   27	  
Vehicles, or as he called them Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, play an integral role 
as well.59  These UAVs were designed to provide tactical commanders on the ground 
with "near-real-time" footage of an environment.60  A ground force commander could 
rely on the UAV to provide an assessment of the terrain, enemy forces, or weather a few 
hundred kilometers away - certainly an invaluable asset at the time.  Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles, as a described by LTC Madden, also provide the "aviation strike force" 
information about targets.  At the time UAVs were not armed, so they would only relay 
information about enemy forces back to the strike force. 
 While the two aircraft systems (AH-64 and RAH-66) operate with upgraded 
sensors, radars, and weapons systems, they worked in teams, each aircraft complimenting 
the capabilities of the other, and with even more information from the UAV.  While their 
technological advancements had profound impacts on the battlefields in subsequent 
engagements, and were marked improvements from previous versions, today's unmanned 
aerial vehicles have these same capabilities on one aircraft.  The argument here is not to 
say that drones are better than rotary-winged aircraft, but rather to highlight that the 
necessary features of an "aviation strike force," designed to provide decision makers 
more options when confronting an enemy, are now on one aircraft. 
 Today's UAVs can be equipped with state-of-the-art observation devices and 
weapons.  For example, the MQ-1B Predator and the larger MQ-9 Reaper, each have a 
number of sensors, communications equipment, and highly accurate weapons.61  Whereas 
LTC Madden's vision for UAVs was to provide reconnaissance support to the primary 
attack (AH-64) and observation (RAH-66) helicopters, today's UAVs are "armed, multi-
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mission, medium-altitude, long endurance remotely piloted aircraft.”62  While each is 
"uniquely qualified to conduct irregular warfare operations in support of Combatant 
Commander objectives," the Reaper is primarily designed for "dynamic execution 
targets," and the Predator is primarily designed as an "intelligence collection asset."63  
Each of these UAVs can carry the AGM-114 Hellfire II missile, while the Reaper can 
also deliver GBU-12 and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions.64  The AGM-114 
missile is a one hundred pound bomb and the GBU-12/38 are five hundred pound bombs; 
the AGM and GBU possess smart bomb technology designed with precision guidance to 
lower collateral damage.65 
 
Requirement for Multi-Mission Aircraft 
 LTC Madden's vision of UAVs supporting the "aviation strike force" bore out of a 
series of guiding documents such as the Joint Vision 2010, the Army Vision 2010, the 
1997 National Defense Panel Report, and the 1997 Annual Report on The Army After 
Next Project.66  Together these documents call for a, "long-range precision capability... 
equipped to conduct full spectrum operations... while sharply reducing our logistics 
footprint."67  As those were the guiding principals for LTC Madden's pursuit to 
incorporate UAVs into the fold of attack aviation, these same requirements can be said 
for today's UAVs.  Indeed, the Predator is a product of the Defense Department's 
requirement "to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
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information combined with a kill capability to the warfighter."68  In the United States 
arsenal, the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper, are the UAVs that meet these 
requirements by serving as the eyes of the battlefield with the ability to engage targets as 
necessary.  This dual use role of the UAV has perhaps provided much of the notoriety of 
drones, but it was also in the making years before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 As Glade argues, "a principal reason for the interest in UAVs was the desire to 
reduce the risk to humans in combat."69  However, not all UAVs are meant for engaging 
targets with attack munitions in combat.  Sometimes the target can be a damaged nuclear 
power facility radiating harmful nuclear energy or a wildfire sweeping across a forest 
floor.  In 2011, after the earthquake-induced tsunami that destroyed the Fukushima 
nuclear power facility, the RQ-4 Global Hawk provided near real-time intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance support (ISR).70  The mission of the Global Hawk is to 
"provide a broad spectrum of ISR collection capability to support joint combatant forces 
in worldwide peacetime, contingency and wartime operations."71  Broad is an 
understatement, with twenty-eight hours of endurance at high altitudes and equipped with 
powerful collection capabilities, weather is not likely to impact its mission.  With very 
few factors impacting its mission capabilities, this UAV is an invaluable asset to all types 
of missions all over the world. 
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Support to Ground Forces 
 Glade, as well as Brunstetter and Braun, argue that not having a human in the 
aircraft is a shortcoming of drones because of the lack of situational awareness.  In 
contrast, General Stanley McChrystal argues drones provide force-multiplying situational 
awareness, albeit incomplete.72  As the former head of the Joint Special Operations 
Command, McChrystal prepared his strategy to take down entire networks of enemy 
fighters - to be successful he would have to do this as simultaneously as possible.  That 
meant he would need more forces, or a more efficient use of the soldiers he had.  Drones 
facilitated that efficiency.  He makes the point that because of drones and their ability to 
provide real-time full motion video on areas around an objective, special operations 
forces are able to conduct missions with fewer commandos on the ground.73  Drones took 
the place of valuable soldiers conducting security operations on a mission, when those 
soldiers could be conducting a simultaneous capture/kill mission on another target.  
McChrystal largely applauds the ground-based situational awareness provided by drones 
claiming it frees up nearly eighty percent of the forces needed to conduct one mission 
before the use of drones.  Even Exum conceded that video links from drones proved 
“incredibly helpful” in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq in 2007.74  Speed was an 
essential element in the surprise attack against enemy fighters, and drones freed up 
valuable soldiers to conduct missions to attack entire networks of enemy fighters in a 
very short time span. 
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 Not only have drones had an impact on the way United States forces conduct their 
operations, adversaries are having to change their tactics as well.  Captured by the 
Taliban in 2008, New York Times reporter David Rohde stated, “the drones [were] a 
terrifying presence that… unnerved and angered guards.”75  The hazards adversaries 
faced by knowing they could be taken out at any second by a drone, without even 
knowing it, caused intense pressure and consequently they have had to change their 
methods.  It impacted the numbers they travel in, and where they sleep.76  The fact that 
drone technology allows American commandos to conduct decentralized operations to 
deconstruct enemy networks simultaneously, and forces enemy fighters out of the 
comforts of their own terrain, means drones are having an impact – and likely the 
intended impact from a technologically superior military. 
 As critics of the drone program lament the use of drones in Pakistan, there is an 
element of necessity here and Pakistanis seem to benefit.  Prior to November 2012 more 
than 900 improvised explosive devices used by terrorists in Pakistan killed Pakistanis by 
the thousands.77  Many of the same targets of the United States, are also targets of the 
Pakistani government.  As the government tries to combat these terrorist networks they 
would be remiss if they did not appreciate the benefits of the drones despite the potential 
collateral damage, which is the cause of great consternation.  The Prime Minister, in 
2008, stated while he may denounce it publicly, he supports the use of drones targeting 
the right people.78  Pakistan’s former President Zardari takes it a step further by stating, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Bergen, 16. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Joint IED Defeat Organization, “Cooperative engagement with Pakistan needed to counter IED networks 
in Afghanistan,” December 13, 2012. https://www.jieddo.mil/news_story.aspx?ID=1502, accessed 21 
March 2013. 
78 Bergen, 16. 
	   32	  
“Kill the seniors.  Collateral damage worries you Americans.  It does not worry me.”79  
While these claims certainly do not provide authorization for collateral damage, given the 
fact that terrorists kill Pakistanis by the thousands each year, certainly counterbalances 
the use of force by drones. 
 Drones have had a significant impact on the enemy, the manner with which 
coalition forces conduct operations, and the discourse on the legalities of prosecuting the 
perpetrators of the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The non-restrictive application of the 
AUMF has certainly facilitated the exponential application of drones in combat.  
However, the evidence suggests that given the American penchant for technological 
superiority, these plans were in the making long before the pursuit of al-Qaeda. 
 
Analysis 
 That the government focuses on pursuing its enemies at all costs is a likely 
consequence of what James C. Scott describes in Seeing Like a State.  He maintains that 
while states singularly focus on influencing one result, the unintended consequences will 
be more difficult to contend with than the original problem.80  As long as States continue 
to myopically address one issue, in this case using drones to target al-Qaeda seeking 
refuge in sovereign nations, a host of secondary issues on the periphery will soon come 
into focus.  In this case it seems to manifest itself into a disdainful position of unmanned 
aerial vehicles.  It is as if drones are autonomously arming themselves and attacking 
targets without instruction from a human.  As the United States focuses on defeating 
those harboring al-Qaeda at all costs, it must be clear of the consequences while more 
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carefully assigning culpability.  Nevertheless, drones are having a serious impact on the 
way the wars have been conducted over the last decade. 
 When speaking about the change in special operations tactics, McChrystal points 
to three technological advancements that allowed for the Joint Special Operations 
Command to dismantle enemy networks with great success.  He credits global 
positioning systems (“GPS”), night-vision equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles with 
great successes in enabling special operators to leverage the technology to exploit the 
weakness of those without it.81  As McChrystal argues these advancements allowed his 
forces to always know where they were by using a GPS, with the aide of the drones they 
knew where the enemy was, and night vision devices allowed them to engage an enemy 
that could not see them.  This sounds more like a recipe for success, at the tactical level, 
than an immoral or less than honorable code of conduct. 
The evidence suggests that there is a need to form a policy covering the use of 
drones, but does not support that the use of drones is immoral – as Exum implies.82  The 
conundrum is this: Drones are used to kill terrorists in remote and austere environments, 
or when the enemy is seeking refuge in a sovereign nation like Yemen or Pakistan.  
Drone strikes, as does any use of force, have the potential to kill innocent civilians, and 
have done so in the past.  Therefore drones cause individuals to take up arms that 
otherwise may not have joined the fight.  In theory these new “recruits” would be lower 
in the hierarchy.  Drones are having so much success killing adversaries that low-level 
operatives are on the list to be targeted – i.e. the senior leadership is already killed.  In 
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essence, drones have the potential to keep beating back an adversary at the lowest levels, 
preventing a strong and influential hierarchy from rising. 
 As Zenko makes his case for a drone policy, he is careful not to acknowledge too 
many of the advantages of drones.  His argument swiftly moves past the impact drones 
are having in reducing enemy fighters to discussing the increase in enemy fighters the 
drones might be causing.  Zenko’s contention is that there is more “blowback” and 
therefore, the costs outweigh the benefits.83  However, as al-Qaeda deploy and refine 
their use of improvised explosive devices, otherwise referred to as roadside bombs, 
claiming the lives of thousands, both their intended targets and innocent bystanders, 
taking to the air with unmanned aerial vehicles reduces the risk to the pilot, and the use of 
ground forces to achieve similar objectives.  When service members climb into a vehicle 
to travel to a target’s location they have several risks.  Roadside bombs litter the roads in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan making the path to the objective more dangerous, for coalition 
or Pakistani forces, than the objective itself.  While the role of drones within the aviation 
arsenal predates the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, these wars certainly accelerated their 
use.  Their accelerated use likely grew out of necessity to seek alternatives to attacking 
al-Qaeda seeking refuge in austere environments, but also as a way to reduce the number 
of service members on the roads. 
 Accelerated use only begins to describe the exponential dependence on unmanned 
aerial vehicles.  In Madden’s projection of an “aviation strike force,” he writes about the 
14,000 hours logged in ten years as an impressive feat.84  In contrast, in August 2011, the 
United States Air Force touts the one-millionth hour logged throughout the Predator’s 
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lifecycle.85  Without question UAVs play a significant role in the way in which the 
United States prosecutes its targets. 
 
Taking to the Sky 
 While Exum’s position on drone strikes being counterproductive may require 
further research, stating they are not honorable is reckless and irresponsible.  Leveraging 
technology to fight an enemy that has taken to guerilla tactics of dressing like civilians 
and hiding roadside bombs, which claim the lives of service members with all too much 
frequency, is a matter of self-preservation and inevitable advancement of a leading 
nation.  Indeed in 2012, IEDs caused more than nineteen hundred casualties among 
United States service members.86  Reducing or even removing risk to service members 
ought to be a mainstay of senior military officials – not described as less than honorable 
practices. 
 Benjamin continues the argument of claiming drones are less than honorable, by 
contrasting what Pakistanis consider an honorable way of fighting.  A staunch opponent 
to the use of drones, she states, "Pashtun tribal culture considers face-to-face combat 
honorable."87  Through 2012, nine hundred IEDs caused more than thirty-seven hundred 
Pakistani casualties.88  Those were not honorable face-to-face attacks against an armed 
assailant; those were men, women, and children carrying about in their normal daily lives 
when a bomb takes their life or wounds them because of a tribal or ethnic dispute.  
Although, in this attack the insurgent would say there was no collateral damage, because, 
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due to their ethnicity or tribe, they were all the intended targets.  While this does not 
necessarily prove the necessity of using drones, it certainly debunks Benjamin’s theory 
that the adversary is fighting honorably. 
 Statistics like these likely drive Pakistani President Zardari to make the seemingly 
repulsive comments he does about not caring about collateral damage.  In a truly war-torn 
land, the struggling Pakistani government is willing to receive any help it can in 
combating the terrorists that are killing so many of its people.  Absent a strong policy 
with Pakistan to play a larger role in combating terrorism, drones provide the only 
mechanism with tangible results, save for the use of ground forces to remove bin Laden.  
That thousands of civilians die each year at the hands of terrorists ushers in the cold 
reality that the government of Pakistan has to essentially accept a relatively small amount 
of potential collateral damage for the good of the many.  Admittedly, that is a difficult 
argument to make.  However, between 2006 and 2013 drones strikes have killed a 
recorded 2,498 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pakistan and 153 civilians.89  By 
contrast, in 2011, terrorists or other extremist factors killed more than thirty-five hundred 
Pakistanis, and more than another thirty-six hundred were injured.90  While the 
government of Pakistan’s comments are not palatable for most democracies, the thirty 
accidental deaths from drone strikes in that same year is likely a lot smaller than if 
American combat ground forces were occupying Pakistan to engage the targets. 
 Knowing that the United States is not going to let insurgents seek refuge in 
weakened states, drones must be appreciated for what they provide, while culpability lies 
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in the hands of policy makers.  Drones provide a natural progression of a technologically 




While acknowledging the need for a revised drone policy, the successes of the 
drone strikes cannot be overlooked.  They have saved an immeasurable number of lives, 
from preventing adversaries from attacking Coalition forces, to identifying roadside 
bombs, and targeting individuals in austere environments.  Drones have changed the way 
in which the United States prosecutes its targets.  With the approval of the host 
government, drones provide senior decision makers with options to target objectives, 
without committing overt acts of war like using combat ground forces.  Drones provide 
tactical-level commanders alternatives to driving down IED laden roads with a capability 
of attacking an objective from the sky.  Unmanned aerial vehicles provide a capability to 
get real-time footage and intelligence in environments that would be harmful to manned 
aircraft – in war or peace.  Technological advancements have long secured the United 
States military as a global superpower.  The advancement of drones is no different. 
 The catalyst of the accelerated nature of the drone program could be argued to be 
the transnational nature of our enemy.  This reality means there needs to be a weapons 
system to keep pace with an elusive enemy, who seeks refuge outside a traditional 
battlefield.  It also could be that risk is too high for pilots, and remotely piloted vehicles 
is the way to avoid risk.  However, it is more likely that drones are a natural progression 
in a technologically driven society.  As Dr. Brynjolfsson states, “Technology is 
transforming innovation at its core, allowing companies to test new ideas at speeds and 
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prices that were unimaginable even a decade ago.”91  While the drones used today are 
likely well ahead of the milestones set years ago, they have been in use for decades.  
Without a doubt, a causal factor in the rapid acceleration of drone technology is the real-
world testing and application in the war zones provided, and to some degree the broad 
interpretation of the AUMF. 
 Unmanned aerial vehicles have certainly changed the way the United States 
prosecutes its targets.  It has even changed the way our adversaries fight.  Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan have routinely changed the way to pursue 
Coalition forces in the region to account for the overhead presence of drones.  Our enemy 
no longer stands in formation with a uniform on and fights with conventional weapons, 
and it no longer stays in a confined area to engage in face-to-face combat.  Instead, as a 
matter of survival, the tactics adopted by our enemy materialize in the form of IEDs, 
planted by the road or delivered in person, and insurgents flee to poverty-stricken areas 
with weak central governments in search of sanctuary, such as Yemen.  To continue to 
fight against this threat, the United States adapted its own practices to increase its 
survival – state of the art unmanned aerial vehicles.  The chasm between technologies 
only differs by the resources available to conduct the attacks – each is directed to exploit 
an enemies’ weakness. 
 Technological advancements have long secured the position of the United States 
as a global superpower.  McChrystal applied these technological advancements to reduce 
the capabilities of terrorist networks around the globe - sometimes with drones, 
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sometimes without - but through advanced technology nonetheless.  The goal of which is 
to reduce the number of American threats while reducing the number of American and 
civilian casualties.  In lieu of deploying ground forces in large numbers around the globe 
to engage America’s enemies, the United States can leverage technology to minimize the 
impacts – as well as reducing the stress on a sovereign nation by not occupying its 
country. 
 More research is needed to continue to explore the actual effects drones are 
having on an insurgency.  Are they driving more towards the fight and is the use worth 
the risk?  If the United States should not use drones, how should the United States pursue 
its enemies in countries like Yemen and Pakistan?  Would occupation drive more 
indigenous people to an insurgency?  These are some questions that, if answered, might 
contribute to the future of unmanned aerial vehicles and their role in the United States 
military. 
 What is clear is the use of drones should be coupled with a policy guiding its use.  
This way the misplaced angst can be directed more appropriately toward the ones 
culpable of their application.  Developing a more transparent policy should enable the 
reputation of drones to remain consistent with its use.  Unmanned aerial vehicles provide 
many benefits in all types of missions and should be regarded as a multi-mission 
technological advancement of a superior military power, not as an immoral nuisance 
committing civil rights violations around the globe.  They provide real-time, or near real-
time, situational awareness of dangerous environments be it a wildfire, damaged nuclear 
power plant, or enemy hideout while removing the risk to a pilot.  In other words, these 
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are not the drones you are looking for – they are only the inanimate objects orchestrated 
by the motives of humans, to secure the safety of such. 
  








 In March 2012, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) overthrew government 
forces in northern Mali and gained control of a portion of the country.92  While the 
government was reeling from a recent military coup d’état against its democratically 
elected government, an al-Qaeda affiliate terrorist organization took advantage of the 
chaos to secure control of northern Mali.  Committed to pursuing al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates, the United States had to decide how to support African forces to combat al-
Qaeda’s aggressiveness while not fully committing ground forces from an already 
overtaxed military.  Unmanned aerial vehicles provide this capability – to combat 
terrorist operatives while not committing large-scale ground forces.  The caution here, 
however, as David Sanger and Conway Waddington assert, is not to overuse UAVs 
because of the tactical convenience.93  As the United States continues to pursue al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates responsible for attacks on United States homeland, against its allies, and 
its interests abroad, North Africa will become increasingly more important for American 
national security, and will also test the strategic and tactical influence of unmanned aerial 
vehicles. 
 This chapter seeks to explore if drones can be used in places like North Africa in 
lieu of ground forces.  Without an effective policy guiding their use, drones may provide 
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leaders with an option only because drones make pursuing terrorist operatives easy.  As 
experiences have shown, there is a growing interest in the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles in places like North Africa, but evidence has also shown that armed UAVs will 
not replace ground forces.  The evidence suggests in most cases, ground forces will likely 
be better suited for strategic objectives, while drones will provide tactical advantages for 
the ground forces.  In order to set the stage for this chapter, a brief outline in the interest 
in North Africa, as well as a brief explanation on AFRICOM’s inception follows next. 
 
Interest in North Africa 
 Less than one year removed from the military coup d’état that overthrew the 
Malian government in Bamako, coupled with the terrorist siege of the north, France 
began asserting its power and interest in the region.  Realizing the “direct security threat,” 
the French government deployed ground forces in early January 2013 to combat terrorist 
fighter groups in the north.94  The interest of the United States came from a concern that 
al-Qaeda and its affiliates will “carry out training, expand recruitment, and advance 
transnational terrorist plots” in their new “safe haven” of northern Mali.95  Wary of 
becoming a “co-belligerent,” the United States offered to extend its assistance to the fight 
via intelligence collection, by way of unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as logistical 
support.96  The use of drones provides the United States the opportunity to support a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Arieff and Johnson, 9. 
95 Ibid., 10. 
96 “U.S. spy drones aiding Mali conflict,” United Press International, March 4, 2013, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/03/04/US-spy-drones-aiding-Mali-conflict/UPI-
40421362411298/ 
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ground war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates without risking the lives of its own troops 
on the ground – unless it is a high-value target.97 
 In discussing the proclivity of the United States’ drone use in places like North 
Africa, two questions must be answered: under what authority does the United States 
engage terrorists in sovereign nations outside the traditional battlefield, and what are the 
American national security interests?  The answer to the first question is often, and 
contentiously, tied to the AUMF.  As noted in Chapter One, the AUMF controls and 
permits the United States to pursue and prosecute those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.  
Drones play a large role in the way in which the United States prosecutes terrorist 
operatives.  To be sure, President Obama states, drones are “part and parcel of our overall 
authority when it comes to battling al-Qaeda.”98  The unmanned systems have indeed 
changed the way the United States prosecutes its targets. 
 For the second question, it has been argued by the Washington Times, and James 
Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, among others, that a collateral benefit to intervening in 
North Africa is to secure petroleum production.99  This argument, however, is not likely 
to be the primary reason why the United States would become involved in Africa.  
According to the United States Energy Information Administration, more than sixty-five 
percent of the United States’ oil imports come from five countries, none of which are in 
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98 David E. Sanger. Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. 
Broadway, 2012, 252. 
99 “U.S. eyes West Africa’s coastline, oil,” The Washington Times, August 10, 2005, 
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Africa.100  It is not that the United States does not care about petroleum production on the 
African continent.  In fact, in 2005, the United States was projected to import twenty-five 
percent of its oil from Africa by 2015.101  However, at the time of this writing, the United 
States seems to be more dependent on the Middle East, and more specifically the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), for its petroleum products.  
Accordingly, the national security interest in North Africa appears more prominently to 
combat terrorist activity.  Further, President Obama stated, "And we will use all elements 
of our national power to defeat al-Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, and all who 
seek a better future."102  This could easily be taken as a tribute to the large number of 
attacks conducted by unmanned aerial vehicles as an element of national power.  On the 
other hand, with no ambiguity, President Obama declares the true reason for an 
involvement in Africa – to combat terrorist activity. 
 
AFRICOM’s Inception 
 Indicative of the importance Africa is to the United States, a separate combatant 
command was stood up to focus solely on strengthening the United States’ relationship 
with African countries.  Until 2007, the African continent was covered under the United 
States European Command (EUCOM).  That meant EUCOM had to cover the entire 
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continent of Africa on top of 51 countries in Europe and part of Asia.103  Given the 
gravity of the security dilemma in Africa, the United States created a separate Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) in 2008 to “build the defense capabilities” within Africa.104  As 
identified by Andrew Feickert, Africa is important because of its role in the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT).105  In fact, prior to standing up AFRICOM, the former 
Commanding General, James Jones, stated, “we don’t pay enough attention to Africa, but 
I think we’re going to have to in the 21st century.”106  Today is different.  With a new 
combatant command stood up specifically to focus on Africa, numerous training 
exercises and initiatives are conducted with African countries with the support that best 
represents their specific needs. 
 At the time of this writing, there are fifteen named exercises, two operations, and 
eleven different programs AFRICOM is conducting with partner nations in Africa.107  For 
example, Flintlock is a counterterrorism exercise that teaches small unit tactics in the 
Sahel and Maghreb area, while Africa Endeavor is an exercise focused on command and 
control for more senior-level military officials.108  These are training initiatives focused 
on strengthening the core capabilities of militaries.  While UAV training is a part of some 
training exercises, it is not the focus.109  The focus is to train the partner nation in an 
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attempt to get to the root causes of the troubled continent, which can only be attained 
through forces on the ground. 
 This chapter is divided into four main sections.  The first section presents an 
overall argument of the discourse surrounding the United States’ role and the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles in North Africa.  The second section presents a case study 
examining the larger issues for using unmanned aerial vehicles as a way to achieve 
national policy objectives.  This section concludes with empirical evidence supporting the 
use of unmanned aerial vehicles in lieu of ground forces for certain missions, but that 
they will not replace the use of humans.  The third section is an analysis of the literature 
and empirical evidence of the likelihood and implications of using drones in North 
Africa.  Finally, this chapter concludes with remarks on the analysis and evidence based 
on the literature and questions to guide further research. 
 
Literature Review  
 While the decision to deploy UAVs to places like Africa may be more intuitive 
than thought provoking, the question gets more attention when trying to decide the 
specific use of drones in places like North Africa – armed weapon of war or strictly for 
ISR support.  As a weapon of counterterrorism, drones provide undeniable advantages to 
defeat terrorist operatives – through lethal targeting as well as an ISR platform for ground 
forces.  Yet as a tool to train indigenous forces in military tactics and decision-making, 
much like Flintlock and Africa Endeavor, there is no substitute for the human interaction 
of ground forces.  As the United States continues to prosecute the war against al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates, drones provide the ability to support an aggressive counterterrorism 
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campaign from a distance.  However, it is also the distance that precipitates convenience, 
or over-use, thereby inviting criticism of drone use because it is easy. 
 
Interest in Africa 
 In order to examine the role and use of unmanned aerial vehicles in North Africa, 
it is important to understand why the United States has interests in what appear to be 
geographically desolate locations: because terrorist organizations are permitted to thrive 
in ungoverned and lawless regions of Africa, namely the Maghreb and Sahel regions, as 
well as the Horn of Africa.110  Carafano and Gardiner posit a number of reasons why 
focus should be on Africa.  They assert that if nothing else the "United States is facing 
increasing international pressure to play a more prominent role in the world's most 
troubled continent."111  Feickert argues that the United States’ concern about "the 
potential for Africa to become a breeding ground for terrorists" is cause for increased 
attention.112  In fact, as the Pentagon plans for a long war on terror, officials in Central 
Command note that they do not want to lose sight of Africa as al-Qaeda and affiliates 
lose their safe havens in Afghanistan and seek refuge in places like Africa.113  Indeed, 
Africa is a hotbed of terrorist activity and continuously struggling with civil strife.114  
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Carafano and Gardiner state the reasons for the attraction to Africa comes from “weak 
civil societies and poor law enforcement and judicial systems” which make it easier for 
nefarious groups to seek refuge.115 
 That Africa is home to terrorist training camps and where terrorist groups have 
more freedom of movement, is largely why North Africa has received the attention it has 
in the last few years.  As United States and coalition forces destroy training camps in 
Afghanistan, Feickert indicates that al-Qaeda has increased its recruiting and training 
camps in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, among others.116  Africa is a large 
continent with much of it uninhabited and the parts that are populated are filled with 
pools of vulnerable people from which to recruit.  Carafano and Gardiner state, "It is no 
coincidence that Osama bin Laden found safe haven in Sudan in the 1990s."117  In the 
pursuit for those responsible for conducting attacks, and planning to conduct attacks, 
against the United States and its allies, the African continent remains a priority for the 
United States military. 
 With most agreeing on the need to become more engaged in Africa, it now 
becomes a question of how.  Carafano and Gardiner argue for a focused presence in 
Africa by working more closely with the African countries to more aggressively mitigate 
the chances of having to respond to security issues with ground forces.118  While 
“counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism campaigns” are necessary factors, and arguably the 
most important, in combating terrorists in Africa, these are only temporary solutions to 
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the more systemic problems that plague the continent – weak, corrupt governments.119  
Indeed, the lawless nature of Africa is not restricted to terrorism, but other forms of illicit 
behavior as well.  African states are also home to many forms of illegal activity, such as 
the illegal harvesting of ivory tusks.120  Drones provide a tactical advantage as a weapon 
to wage war, but seem to fall short of affecting corrupt governments. 
 
Support from a Distance 
 In the mid-twentieth century, the French had established “a variety of formal 
defence and military co-operation accords with the Francophone states in Africa.”121  The 
French wanted to protect its citizens living abroad as well as ensuring protection of the 
“strategic resources,” described by Gregory as, “oil and uranium, and a ready market for 
French goods, French culture, and French ideas.”122  Protecting its French citizens and 
equities in Africa has brought French forces to the continent numerous times and in fact 
has led to military agreements with nearly two dozen countries as a step to “constitute a 
permanent intervention,” as described by Robin Luckham.123  For these reasons, the 
French will have to look beyond the tactical capabilities of the drones and focus their 
efforts on intervention through the use of ground forces in combat and training roles. 
 Drone technology is likely a step in the direction of supporting partner nations in 
combating terrorism while not committing ground forces.  Some, such as Carafano and 
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Gardiner, claim there are several reasons that the United States should not commit ground 
forces in Africa.  While there is a desire to pursue al-Qaeda and its affiliates at all costs, 
deploying ground forces for armed combat in North Africa could not only create more 
friction within the indigenous populations, it would likely be particularly unpopular with 
the American population given the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.124  For these 
reasons, providing ISR and logistical support to African forces—as well as the French in 
Mali—via unmanned aerial systems is a way to combat terrorist groups without 
deploying large amounts of ground forces in the same manner as the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 On the other hand, as Sanger discusses, the potential implications for the “light 
footprint” - the reliance of drones to achieve strategic objectives - may come with heavier 
costs than if “a much more decisive force,” (i.e., ground forces) were used in the first 
place.125  In other words, ground forces may be able to achieve military goals in shorter 
time than through a series of drone strikes.  Furthermore, the over reliance on the tactical 
functions of drones because they are easy to use, comes dangerously close to defining the 
strategy.126  The important point being that drone use in Africa, at least at first glance, is 
an easier alternative to ground forces, but when the strategic objectives call for a different 
element of American national power, the United States must be ready to commit the 
necessary level of military support in the interest of long-term stability. 
 Training, however, will only go so far.  As Stephen Metz claims when discussing 
the role of drones, “Solving root causes is certainly easier with insurgent leaders and 
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cadre out of the way.”127  To achieve this, the United States has shown examples of 
leaning to drone strikes as well as trusting this responsibility with combat ground forces.  
To be sure, from 1992 to 2008, the United States engaged in more than thirty-two armed 
interventions in Africa.128 
 
Golden Hammer 
 Western military training will only go so far, however, when it comes time to deal 
devastating setbacks to terrorist groups in the near-term.  As terrorist operations are 
uncovered, it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to act swiftly to prevent 
an imminent attack.  Since the, “large-scale use of U.S. combat forces in Africa is not 
desirable,” and the environment is not conducive to large scale forces, yet it is prime for 
unmanned aerial vehicles, drones provide the option to pursue terrorists.129 
 This then begs a question of doing something because of an ability to do it as 
opposed to doing something that is necessary.  Conway Waddington argues the 
implications of the tactical advantages presented by precision-guided missiles in that they 
make it easy to target individuals with minimal collateral damage.130  Waddington seems 
to take the argument of drones one step further by placing blame on the continued use of 
armed drones on the accuracy of the weapon systems.  The argument is essentially 
indicating that the “technological promises of drones and precision strike… encouraged 
the implementation of tactics.”131  This same reason, however, is what may continue to 
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drive the use of drones when pursuing al-Qaeda.  As Waddington asserts, drone strikes 
provide “political-risk-mitigating properties,” which is an illusion of the electorate being 
credited with an aggressive pursuit of terrorists while simultaneously avoiding a 
commitment of deploying ground forces.132 
 Waddington references Maslow’s “Golden Hammer,” meaning that if this is the 
only tool, then it is looked upon to solve all your needs.133  This reference closely 
resembles Leon Panetta’s assertion, among others, that drones seem to be the only 
effective weapon against terrorists seeking cover in geographically, or politically, 
unsuitable environments for ground forces.  For these reasons, scholars and professionals 
alike, such as Micah Zenko and Waddington, argue for a more closely regulated use of 
drone strikes as an implement of war.134  Just because a drone was used, however, does 
not mean that the target would not have been worthy of ground force usage.  The 
environment, such as the vast and open deserts within the Sahel, along with zero 
collateral damage, may have been conducive to a drone strike.  This method was able to 
achieve its goal while removing the risk to American forces on the ground by using an 
unmanned system from the sky. 
 Drones, enabled with precision missiles and state of the art surveillance 
equipment, present a reliable and proven method of engaging targets.  The proliferation 
in their use throughout the world has shown that the desire is there to continue to use 
drones in multiple capacities.  The use of unmanned aerial vehicles is not just for 
counterterrorism operations, but a natural progression of use in other parts of the world as 
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well.  After all, drones carry state of the art surveillance equipment.  The MQ-1B 
Predator, a fairly well known UAV of the United States Air Force, can detect the heat 
signature of a human from ten thousand feet.135 
 In a recent move to increase ISR functions on North Korea, as well as Chinese 
ships in East and South China Seas, Japan has agreed to host the United States Air 
Force’s premier ISR UAV collection platform, the RQ-4 Global Hawk.136  However, this 
may come with a price.  While the added collection benefits will certainly provide 
decision makers with potentially more timely and accurate information, the move will 
almost certainly be a great nuisance for the Chinese.137  However, Secretary Kerry stated 
of this partnership with Japan, “this bilateral alliance remains a vital element of our 
respective national security strategies.”138  Weighing the risks, provoking China is worth 
the unprecedented ISR coverage of North Korea for the United States and Chinese Seas 
for the Japanese, and seemingly worth strengthening the relationship with Japan.  
Strengthening the bond with an ally to preserve their national security is not new for the 
United States, and it comes with collateral benefits.  In the case of Africa, teaming with 
French and African forces in a non-combat, support role prevents the United States from 
getting pulled into a ground war while ensuring the tactical advantages of drones is 
available to allied forces. 
 The argument of relying on drones to solve long-term strategic objectives is weak 
on examples, while their use as a tactical weapon is still relevant.  As former Assistant 
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Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, when discussing what the military plan should 
include, states, “ensuring that the proposed military action is adequately linked to a 
sufficiently detailed political strategy and end-state for military operations.”139  While the 
Assistant Secretary’s comments are specific to Northern Mali, it supports choosing a 
tactic that supports the end-state as opposed to succumbing to Maslow’s “Golden 
Hammer.”  What can be deduced from the current literature is while drones do have their 
place in providing the Unites States a technological advantage; they are no supplement to 
training the indigenous militaries of Africa in solving the root causes of why terrorists are 
seeking safe havens in the Maghreb, Sahel and Horn of Africa.  Rather the United States 
should employ all its elements of national power as appropriate, to include ground forces 
and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
 To get to the root of the problem, the United States and its allies need to ensure 
they are not only focused on existing terrorists, but also the reasons for the terrorist rich 
environment; thus the reason not to rely on drones alone to achieve stability in Africa.  
Focusing on the military services, law enforcement and judicial systems, and ensuring 
political systems are democratic are paramount in addressing the security concerns within 
Africa.140  An aggressive counterinsurgency campaign in Africa could precipitate reduced 
criminal activity overall given the proclivity of terrorists to engage in all kinds of illegal 
and nefarious activity.  But to ensure the environment is stable enough to thwart 
emerging threats, a more hands-on approach is required.  To achieve these desired effects 
requires a more focused approach by the United States. 
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Case Study 
 Many examples exist of using drones to target insurgents in North Africa.  This 
underscores the importance of balancing a potential reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles, 
the use of combat ground forces, and training partner African nations in counterterrorism 
tactics.  The reason for choosing the following examples is to examine the larger picture, 
which is the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and to consider whether they are 
better than ground forces in places like North Africa.  To do this, the case study contrasts 
combat military actions in Somalia and Libya, as well as United States support to Mali, 
with the arguments presented in the current literature. 
 United States support to French and Malian forces--largely consisting of un-
armed UAV ISR coverage--highlights the desire to combat al-Qaeda, as well as reducing 
the risk to American ground forces.  In contrast, the October 2013 missions in Libya and 
Somalia indicate the United States is fully committed to using combat ground forces 
when either the conditions are not suitable for a drone strike or the target value is high 
enough to warrant the risk to ground forces. 
 
UAVs, Not Ground Forces 
 In March 2012, shortly after the military coup d’état, AQIM took control of the 
Northern portion of the country of Mali.141  France deployed forces to assist the Malian 
government to combat AQIM and to regain control of the Northern part of the country.  
While the European Union and Japan, among others, pledged to provide foreign aid in the 
sum of hundreds of millions of dollars, the United States was preparing to offer monetary 
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and military assistance.142  The fact that the United States did not send in troops 
compliments Carafano’s and Gardiner’s counsel that the United States defer to what other 
countries will do to support before determining its own level and method of support. This 
is important because losing technology, albeit expensive, is seemingly far more 
acceptable to the American public than committing ground forces on another continent to 
engage in war. 
 As French forces partnered with Malian forces to take back seized portions of 
Northern Mali from AQIM, Jeff Gilmour argues, “the crucial issue is likely to be 
ensuring that the African forces which take over from departing French troops are 
properly trained.”143  In other words, once the French push AQIM back and French troops 
return home, it will be important for the remaining African forces to keep AQIM out of 
Mali.  The point of Gilmour’s comment underscores the importance of training Malian 
forces while simultaneously leading the charge against terrorist fighters.  The French are 
able to combat AQIM with far greater efficiency, but in order for Mali to remain in 
Malian control, it is important for the Malian government to take the lead as French 
forces depart.  In other words, as Carafano and Gardiner assert, the United States will 
benefit more by training the militaries of African countries.144  This exchange is only 
possible when there are allied forces on the ground to conduct the training in person – not 
through any technological advancement, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Perhaps, it 
can be left to the partner nations to conduct these training missions, while the United 
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States supports through UAVs.  However, drones do have their place, and it is an 
important one too.  
 The conflict in Mali, where American combat ground forces were not deployed, 
was being supported by the United States through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
serving ISR functions.145  Real-time video and data were sent to the French enabling their 
ground forces to find and engage enemy fighters directly.146  The ISR capabilities of 
drones enabled more than sixty attacks against enemy forces within the first few months 
of serving in this support role.147  The extension of UAV support to the French falls in 
line with President Obama’s “new model for counterterrorism,” in that support is 
provided via drones “so American troops do not have to” fight the ground war – unless, 
as seen in Libya and Somalia, the conditions of engaging the target are not conducive to a 
drone strike.148 
 Cautious in becoming a “co-belligerent” in the Malian conflict, the military 
assistance provided by the United States largely came in the form of logistical and ISR 
activities.149  Indeed ISR support to the French and African troops came from unmanned 
aerial vehicles, but not from armed drones, and these ISR collection platforms were used 
to provide “raw data” to French and African troops for their own consumption and 
determination on how to use the information.150  Unmanned aerial vehicles provide a 
degree of separation between being actively engaged in a combat role, where the loss of 
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human life is an expected outcome, and supporting combat operations without risking a 
human life. 
 There are many advantages to using UAVs, especially in places like the Sahel 
where the environment is not conducive to ground forces, yet it is prime terrain for “sky-
borne observational devices.”151  Since drones do not require ground forces, the United 
States does not have to contend with the logistical difficulties that accompany combat 
ground forces for extended periods of time.152  Some drone bases are relatively small, 
such as the one in Niger with approximately one hundred people supporting operations in 
Mali.153 
 As a prime example of the United States relying on unmanned aerial vehicles, the 
United States is providing more support to the French via drones than with manned 
aircraft.  In contrast to the more than seventy manned aircraft from nearly a dozen 
countries dedicated to support Malian forces, the United States is relying more upon its 
unmanned systems.154  This could also support Carafano’s and Gardiner’s proposition 
that the United States should look to support the conflicts in Africa after assessing what is 
missing from the support of other partner nations.155  In either case, the evidence supports 
that the United States views its subject matter expertise on unmanned systems as the best 
way to support a conflict, and further, that armed conflicts today should not be waged 
without these technological advantages. 
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Ground Forces, Not Armed Drones 
 In early October 2013, with drone coverage already on the continent, the United 
States conducted two different operations simultaneously using combat ground forces.156  
On the coast of Somalia, United States Navy SEALs pursued a senior al Shabaab leader 
and engaged in a fire fight with militants, but subsequently had to retreat due to the 
potential for civilian casualties.157  The use of ground forces, and the subsequent 
withdrawal due to civilian casualties, indicates that while drones provide invaluable ISR 
capabilities, they are no substitute to ground forces.  This is important to highlight 
because the use of force was not elevated to overcome adversaries in the area, but rather 
the operation was aborted because the collateral damage would have been too high. 
 Much like the risk President Obama took when he chose to send ground combat 
forces after Osama bin Laden, he took a risk allowing ground forces to enter Libya.  
Leading up to the decision to intervene in Libya, President Obama proclaimed, there will 
be “no boots on the ground.”158  Despite those words, and the plethora of drone activity in 
North Africa, targeting the Libyan militant indicted for bombing United States Embassies 
in Africa was important enough to warrant the use of combat ground forces.159 
 What is significant about these two operations is that they emphasize the fact that 
drones are not the “only game in town” when it comes to places like North Africa.  For 
whatever the reason, the military decided not to rely on drone strikes.  It does not mean 
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drones were not used as a surveillance and intelligence collection platform, but it does 
show that the United States is committed to using ground forces in lieu of drone strikes, 
and not just using its “Golden Hammer” because it would have been easier. 
 In North Africa, and specifically in Mali, targeting terrorist operatives is best left 
to unmanned aerial vehicles when the terrain supports this tactic, while African forces 
conduct security missions in the populated cities.160  The success of the unmanned 
systems in the Malian conflict has made such an impression that the French are pursuing 
the acquisition of unarmed MQ-4 Reaper systems from the United States.161  While Mali 
provides a clear depiction of the “new model for counterterrorism,” reducing the risk to 
ground forces by way of unmanned aerial vehicles, the operations in Libya and Somalia 
support the commitment of the United States to pursue terrorists with ground forces as 
well.  In either case, coupled with the efforts of AFRICOM to train the militaries of 
partner nations, the United States seems to be leveraging the technological capabilities of 
drones to support ground forces, but is still committed to the region enough to send 
ground forces – both to train and for combat purposes – based on specific mission 
requirements.  In other words, drones are not relied upon for operations that are best 
suited for troops on the ground, but they are looked upon as a way of reducing the risks to 
ground forces. 
 
Proliferation of Drone Technology 
 The development of unmanned systems has grown leaps and bounds in the last 
dozen years or so – most, but not all, of the development and penchant for drone use 
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comes from the United States.162  Since before the Second World War, the United States 
has used unmanned aerial vehicles, also referred to as remotely piloted vehicles.163  
While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan did not create a demand for drone use, it 
unarguably accelerated its use and application.  There are more than “4,000 different 
unmanned aircraft platforms” throughout the world, of which the United States is 
projected to account for roughly forty-five percent of that global market.164  To be sure, 
the United States Department of Defense spends nearly half of the world’s budget on 
unmanned robotics systems, of which ninety-percent is on aerial platforms.165  In other 
words, almost half of all the money spent on robotics around the world is spent on UAVs 
by the United States.  As with the use of American drones in Africa, most of the drones in 
circulation are used as ISR collection platforms.166 
 The United States is not the only country heavily investing in drones; China is 
pushing to surpass the United States in terms of the number of aircraft, and the UAV 
industry in the Middle East is expected to hit the $1 billion mark by 2021, while North 
Korea inquires about armed and unarmed drones as well.167  Around the world, there are 
varying degrees of manufacturing ability; yet, most countries seem to be showing interest 
in their use.  South Africa is currently the only country on the African continent that is 
manufacturing UAVs, although given the surveillance capabilities of drones the entire 
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continent provides ample opportunities for their use in all capacities.168  A plausible 
explanation for the spike in interest for UAVs likely comes from much of the success 
coalition forces have had in Afghanistan, but perhaps also driven out of necessity, as well 
as the interest to reduce the risk to their own troops.169  The evidence suggests continued 
use is inevitable. 
 The fact that so many countries are pursuing unmanned technology is not the 
surprise.  As FitzSimonds claims, “nations have always pursued innovation to increase 
military effectiveness relative to potential adversaries.”170  The innovation behind 
American drones has enabled its forces to engage enemy targets from great distances.  
That other countries, in the words of Busch, “have not shown neither the will, the cash or 
the wit to produce their own,” is likely the most surprising statistic.  On the other hand, as 
Parsons’ research has concluded many other countries are now in the hunt for UAV 
technology – a telling sign of other nations potentially looking for drones to conduct 
military operations in lieu of their ground forces. 
 The dominance of this industry by the United States has made the drone such a 
formidable, seemingly unchallenged, weapon of war.  So much so that President Obama 
has essentially defended the drone program as a use of “preemptive strikes against 
terrorists” via drones, ostensibly to limit the number ground forces outside the traditional 
battlefields.171  While drone technology provides a tactical advantage, which at times 
emboldens strategic operations, it will not take the place of ground forces working to 
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solve the crux of the issue.  Or in the words of Macky Sall, “we need training, we need 
material, we need intelligence,” when speaking about the security of Africa as a whole. 
 
Analysis 
 The evidence suggests that drones are the ideal weapon of choice in places like 
Africa given their endurance and precision-strike capabilities.  The long mission time of 
drones makes them an ideal candidate to provide ISR support to ground forces in training 
or combat missions, or to engage an enemy fighter when the environment is right.  When 
pursuing an enemy that “is not guided by territorial jurisdiction,” unmanned aerial 
vehicles provide the ability to reach enemy fighters without committing ground forces.172  
In other words, since the enemy is not located in one place, the United States will have to 
widen its aperture extending outside traditional battlefields, such as North Africa, to 
pursue the dictum of both Presidential administrations since September 2001. 
 Deploying ground forces around the globe to chase al-Qaeda operatives will not 
likely be a popular decision with the American public – nor is it likely a sustainable 
course of action for the military.  Drones on the other hand provide the opportunity to 
engage a target without having combat ground forces.  This gives policy makers the 
chance to target terrorist operatives outside the traditional battlefields without further 
straining a military that has fought two wars in a nine-year period, and enters its 
fourteenth year in Afghanistan.  However, it is incumbent on the United States to ensure 
drones are not used just because they can be; meaning that drones do not shape United 
States strategy to Africa.  As Gouré discusses the impact of new technology, they “give 
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decisive if not necessarily strategic advantage to the party employing them.”173  Given the 
creation of AFRICOM and the focus on training African partner nations, as well as recent 
combat action in Libya and Somalia by ground forces, it appears that drones are not 
shaping United States strategic objectives in Africa, at this time. 
 However, Presidential administrations since 2001 have had the same message: we 
will defeat terrorists.  While in early 2002, the message was focused on retribution for 
September 11th, years later the theme is the same from President Obama when talking 
about terrorists, and specifically al-Qaeda.  President Obama declared, “we will defeat 
you,” and in October 2013, Secretary Kerry proclaimed terrorists, “can run but they can’t 
hide.”174  The messages are clear and unambiguous enough to realize that as long as al-
Qaeda is considered a threat, the United States will be in pursuit the world over.  While 
the use of drones has aroused considerable debate on the legality and effectiveness as a 
tool of counterinsurgency, they have been effective in killing more than three thousand 
enemy fighters in Pakistan and Yemen alone.175  To be clear though, drone strikes, 
outside Afghanistan, take place in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, according to open 
source watch groups.176  Regardless of the measure to counter an insurgency, Metz 
claims, “It still requires putting some people in the dirt.”177  But an important point is that 
drones are not just killing machines.  In North Africa the only United States drone strikes 
appear to be focused on Somalia, while support over the rest of the continent, Mali in 
particular, comes in the form of ISR collection.  Given the requirement to pursue al-
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Qaeda at all lengths, drones provide invaluable ISR and combat functions that remove the 
risk to ground forces in combat, as well as the footprint required to sustain combat forces. 
 On the other hand, given the technological capabilities, and lethal precision, what 
if the recent mission on the coast of Somalia, where the United States sustained zero 
casualties, resulted in Navy SEALs getting wounded?  Would questions arise on why the 
unmanned systems were not used in a lethal strike?  Without knowing the specifics of the 
mission it remains unclear if drones were performing ISR functions, but what is known is 
that they were not used in a lethal capacity.  What is telling about this mission, where 
drone strikes have occurred, is that the technological advantage of drones does not appear 
to be driving all strategic objectives in Africa.  Furthermore, it is indicative that the 
United States does not always rely on drones in lieu of ground forces. 
 Numerous examples of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and to a lesser extent, 
Somalia, as well as the rapid proliferation of UAV technology, are indicators that armed 
UAVs are the weapons of choice in targeting terrorist operatives.  However, as evidenced 
in the cases of sending ground forces, not armed UAVs, in Somalia and Libya suggest 
that the United States is not always looking for drones to target terrorist operatives.  
Accordingly, this suggests that the United States is not looking to drones as a 
replacement for ground forces, but rather a tactical weapon system ensuring the success 
of ground forces. 
 In a perfect world, the answer to combat terrorism or to thwart an insurgency 
would rest squarely on the indigenous population’s military or law enforcement and 
would take place without any collateral damage.  This however, is simply not how it 
works.  In places like North Africa, and for that matter most of Africa, it is the very lack 
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of ability to prevent terrorism from growing that demands the attention of the United 
States.  To prevent terrorist groups from conducting attacks on American interests in 
Africa and planning and training to conduct attacks in the United States, a combination of 
drones, combat ground forces, as well as ground forces training partner nations are used 
to undermine the efforts of terrorist organizations and it appears to be these factors that 
are shaping the strategic objectives in North Africa. 
 
Conclusion 
 After more than a dozen years of fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda, among 
others, in Afghanistan, coupled with nine years of simultaneous fighting in Iraq, the 
United States military and its civilian leaders have reason to look for technological 
innovations that reduce the human footprint as well as the risk to its service members.  
However, deciding whether or not to use unmanned aerial vehicles in places like North 
Africa comes with a few caveats. 
 Drones may be easy to use in certain circumstances, but they should not drive 
strategic decisions.  For example, if the goal is to ensure African military forces are better 
trained and equipped to combat terrorists, drones will not achieve that goal.  Troops on 
the ground would be better suited to train and equip African partner nations.  
Furthermore, evidence has shown that combat ground forces are still used to capture or 
kill high value targets.  As a tactical support tool, drones can provide invaluable 
battlefield intelligence on enemy forces, and in some cases engage them with precision-
guided missiles. 
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 In the interest of reducing the risk to military service members, drones provide 
that degree of separation by removing the pilot from the aircraft.  Coupled with the 
reduced footprint on the ground, this makes drones an even more attractive instrument of 
war for policy makers aggressively pursuing al-Qaeda under the auspices of the GWOT.  
On the other hand, the cautionary advice of negative effects of the light footprint strategy 
carries some careful considerations.  If the United States relies too heavily on drones to 
serve as the primary tool in targeting enemy forces without complimentary ground forces 
training African nations on reducing civil strife, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the 
indigenous population to an insurgency, then the United States accepts the risk of 
endlessly pursuing targets in North Africa.  
 The questions to guide future research from this study entail better understanding 
of the long-term effects of supporting a war via drones.  If drones provide for a reduced 
footprint, does that impact the ability of the United States armed forces to work 
effectively on the ground with partner nations?  Will an over-reliance on drones label the 
United States as an absentee partner, not fully committed to missions that may cause 
casualties among its service members?  Will that risk aversion affect the quality and 
readiness of the United States military? 
 Only time will tell if this assessment is right.  It is likely safe to assume that the 
United States, among many other countries, will continue to rely heavily on drones to 
provide key ISR support to ground forces, and to a lesser extent to serve as an attack 
force, for the foreseeable future in places like North Africa.  However, whether or not 
they will be better than ground forces for American national security purposes may not be 
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answered for a long time.  In any case, the tactical advantages of drones are many, but 
when the mission calls for personal interaction, nothing can replace ground forces. 








 Unmanned aerial vehicles have made a significant contribution toward protecting 
ground forces and prosecuting the enemies of the United States through their ISR and 
strike capabilities.  But are they being used effectively and efficiently to meet the 
strategic goals of the United States?  To that end, a clear goal is needed to ensure the use 
of force via drones is consistent with the strategic goals of the United States.  As 
President Obama adopts a “COIN strategy only in the service of a counterterrorism goal,” 
he attempts to conflate two disparate terms.178  In other words, because COIN and CT are 
not synonymous, limiting the use of force to COIN may leave out the necessary 
components of CT required to accomplish United States strategy.  This hybrid approach 
does not fully leverage the necessary components of either CT or COIN, and in fact may 
be counterproductive and weaken the effects of both.179  Consequently, drones risk being 
criticized for their application in one type of mission, while they were being used to 
support another type. 
 This is relevant because since its inception, “air power” has become a principal 
component of the United States’ strategy in wartime, and drones are no exception.180  
How will an increase in drone usage affect the United States’ ability to counter an 
insurgency and fight terrorism?  Furthermore, are drones better suited for COIN or CT 
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operations?  This chapter seeks to explore if drones, when used properly, are an ideal 
weapon of war.  Further, if the theory is true, the expectation is that drones can support 
both CT and COIN missions.  However, the type of mission will need to be clearly 
identified in order to ensure the proper use of force is applied from drones. 
 Throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, politicians and military leaders 
alike have seemingly used counterterrorism and counterinsurgency interchangeably, as if 
these terms are synonymous.  Michael Boyle describes how these terms can be confused 
when he states, “terrorist threats are now regularly described as insurgencies and vice 
versa.”181  Using these terms interchangeably, though they mean different things, causes 
confusion and risks misplacing culpability when things go wrong.  According to the 
Department of Defense (DoD), counterinsurgency is defined as, “Comprehensive civilian 
and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and 
address its root causes.”182  This definition further requires an understanding of 
“insurgency.”  David Kilcullen defines an insurgency as “a popular movement that seeks 
to change the status quo through violence and subversion.”183  Fundamental in the 
process of defeating or containing the popular movement is the importance placed on 
supporting the relevant central government and population. 
 By contrast, counterterrorism efforts work to target a terrorist group or individual 
with little to no regard for additional factors.  This is important because these efforts may 
not place any importance on supporting the central government.  DoD defines 
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counterterrorism as, “Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to 
influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist 
networks.”184  In this definition “terrorist” requires a further explanation.  David 
Kilcullen defines terrorism as, “politically motivated violence against non-combatants 
with the intention to coerce through fear.”185  As counterinsurgency targets root causes, 
counterterrorism targets the individual actors.  Drones can provide support in either case 
– exploiting a network through kinetic strike or intelligence collection.  However, their 
use needs to support the specific strategy being undertaken: counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to present an argument for when drones can 
properly support both COIN and CT operations.  As discussed in previous chapters, 
drones provide invaluable ISR support enabling ground forces, in either capacity, to 
achieve their mission, but do not completely replace ground forces.  In order for drones to 
be more effective in their use, the type of mission they are supporting should be more 
clearly defined to guide their use.  This is important to understand because the way in 
which an enemy is described can affect the way the United States will pursue its enemies 
through the instruments of national power.186   
 This chapter is divided into four sections.  First, the literature review examines the 
differences in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency principles and explains how drones 
can support either one.  Second, a case study contrasts drone applications in Pakistan with 
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Yemen and Afghanistan, to support counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.  Third, the 
analysis section provides a thorough review of the critical comments and reflects on the 
use of force from unmanned vehicles.  Lastly the conclusion section summarizes the 
points made within this chapter and raises questions to guide further research.  
Additionally, statistics in this study on civilian casualties and the number of strikes were 
taken from The Long War Journal.187 
 
Literature Review 
 Much of the debate in learning how to combat forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 
comes from conflating counterterrorism with counterinsurgency.  Although this may 
seem like semantics to some, the reason it is important to keep these terms separate is 
because these words will drive how an enemy is prosecuted by the United States.  In turn, 
how the enemy is prosecuted is where drones become involved.  Leading 
counterinsurgency experts, such as David Kilcullen, argue that the war in Afghanistan, 
and more broadly against “global jihad,” should be prosecuted with counterinsurgency 
techniques and therefore have become critical of drone use.188  Others in the field, such as 
Michael Boyle, challenge that claim and state al-Qaeda is not a global insurgency, but 
rather a “resilient and highly lethal terrorist organization… that has not articulated a 
vision of political life.”189  Drones play an important part of this argument as it pertains to 
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the type of mission the drone is being tasked to complete – supporting counterterrorism 
or counterinsurgency operations. 
 Although there appears to be some general agreement on being able to identify a 
classic insurgency (such as the National Liberation Front in Vietnam), classifying the key 
antagonists in the War on Terror (such as al-Qaeda) seems to lack similar clarity.  
Categorizing al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization intuitively implies a counterterrorist 
approach, yet there is a body of scholarly and professional work, from Kilcullen for 
example, indicating a counterinsurgency strategy is more appropriate.190  To be sure, the 
Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual expanded their definition in 
that, “today’s operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency, one which 
seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide.”191  This expanded definition supports 
Kilcullen’s description of a more global insurgency as a threat not contained within a 
single state.  Kilcullen takes this globalization one step further and posits another 
adaptation of insurgency, a “resistance insurgency.”192  A resistance insurgency is 
interested more in causing mass chaos and undermining the role of the government than it 
is in gaining political control. 
 In regard to Afghanistan, Boyle makes the distinction that combating the Taliban 
is a function of counterinsurgency, while targeting al-Qaeda is a function of 
counterterrorism.  Because they are vastly different terms with different sets of 
parameters to achieve the goal, using these two terms interchangeably could work at 
“cross-purposes” if commingled.193  Boyle states, “A CT mission would focus 
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exclusively on Al-Qaeda while offering little or no support to the Karzai government; a 
COIN mission envisages a comprehensive commitment to defeating the Taleban and 
rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying Al-Qaeda operatives there.”194  In other 
words, deciding between COIN and CT is the difference in level of support to the host 
government and the use of force. 
 On the other hand, Kilcullen makes the argument that because insurgents use 
terrorism as a persuasive tactic, does not imply they are terrorists requiring a 
counterterrorist approach to combat their methods.  Kilcullen advocates for 
counterinsurgency methods on a global scale.  Briefly describing the basic principles of 
CT and COIN will provide insight to using drones to exploit an enemy's weakness and 
strengthen the ability of the United States to conduct these operations. 
 
The Basic Principles of Counterinsurgency 
 Counterinsurgent theorists and experts generally believe that fundamental to the 
practice of COIN is pacification, "winning hearts and minds," and the denial of an 
insurgents' safe haven, among other considerations to an insurgent force.195  The steps 
taken in a successful COIN strategy place as much, if not more, emphasis on the local 
population than on the insurgent.  However, each step taken is calculated to strengthen 
the central government and weaken the insurgency.  Kalev Sepp acknowledges that in 
studying successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgent warfare, an "outline," or "best 
practices" can be revealed, but it is far from a prescriptive pronouncement of a way to 
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defeat all insurgencies.196  Sepp posits the focus must be on "the country's people and 
their belief in and support of their government."197  As a result, the foremost objective of 
the host government must be on "winning [the people's] hearts and minds."198  To be 
sure, government abuse of human rights is not only seen in counterinsurgency failures, 
but also as the trigger of an insurgency.199  Therefore, a basic premise of 
counterinsurgency, in order to placate the insurgency, is to achieve some level of 
negotiation between the insurgency and government.200  On the other hand, in a 
resistance insurgency, because there is no desire to govern, negotiations may be based 
more on ideologies than politics.  A resistance insurgency, described by Kilcullen, places 
more emphasis to “discredit” and “undermine” the existing government without a 
comprehensive plan to govern.201  This type of insurgency generally lacks a “unified 
front” and simply seeks to destroy the existing government and “expel foreigners.”202 
 
The Basic Principles of Counterterrorism 
 By contrast, counterterrorist methods do not directly place an emphasis on the 
host nation’s ability to govern or win over their own population, nor are there hearts and 
minds to focus on placating.  The DoD’s Joint Publication 3-26 states the military 
strategic objectives in counterterrorism are to deny resources, enable partners to counter- 
and prevent terrorism in their own country, defeat terrorists, and establish conditions to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Sepp, 8. 
197 Sepp, 9. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” 606. 
201 Kilcullen. "Counter-insurgency redux," 115. 
202 Ibid., 116. 
	   76	  
counter ideological support.203  The priority of these efforts are “actions taken directly 
against terrorist networks” themselves.204  Or as Boyle states of counterterrorism, 
methods are “offensive measures undertaken to stop an adversary from employing 
terrorism;” the focus of which being the one employing terrorism.205  These measures 
include, “to capture or kill senior leadership and senior operatives, eliminate safe havens, 
destroy training camps and resources, capture or kill cell members (foot soldiers), and 
disrupt recruiting and indoctrination efforts.”206  These are actions taken against an 
adversary either through the use of training and equipping the host nation or conducted 
unilaterally, with the preference on the former. 
 
Conflating CT and COIN 
 There are similarities in the two, such as they are both part of Irregular Warfare, 
but the fundamental difference appears to be in how force is applied.207  Force applied in 
support of counterinsurgency appears to be more calculated and deliberate, as well as 
more judiciously applied, while weighing second and third order effects; whereas in 
counterterrorism, force is applied to eliminate a target without prejudice and may happen 
quickly.  When used together the effects of one can negate the other.  Boyle raises four 
primary concerns.  First, “popular backlash” occurs because CT can be seen as a violent 
use of force, and the violence in COIN should be more “choreographed” so as not to 
invade too much of the private population’s security.  Second, “counter mobilization” 
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may occur due to the expanding target list of CT operations given the ease with which 
targets are pursued, thereby creating “mission creep” into COIN operations, and causing 
instability due to a potentially more indiscriminate targeting practice.  Third, “legitimacy 
gap” is created when CT operations are conducted in a country because it implies the host 
government cannot unilaterally counter the threat, thereby causing an incentive to 
publicly protest strikes and argue threats to sovereignty. Forth, “leverage” is lost with the 
host government when it becomes obvious that the fight cannot afford to be lost, and the 
host government and the insurgency can exploit the lost leverage by dragging out the 
war.208 
 Equally important in understanding what to do in counterinsurgency is 
understanding what not to do.  In counterinsurgency, Sepp cautions against an emphasis 
on capturing or killing insurgents as opposed to placing the emphasis on working to 
placate the population and assuage their needs.209  In particular the use of air power as a 
means of "attriting them to a point of collapse" is a method proven to be unsuccessful in 
counterinsurgencies.210  Yet in counterterrorism “the threat and elusiveness of the target 
demand an immediate, often lethal response.”211  Counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency have separate meanings for what the military is to achieve in either 
one, and more importantly, how it is to be achieved.  Bolstering the capability of the 
central government or disregarding the role of the central government is the obvious 
contradiction when using the terms interchangeably and drones become the culpable 
party in excessive force when trying to achieve either one. 
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Drone use in CT and COIN 
 Kenneth Anderson, making “The Case for” drones, takes the position that drones 
may be ideal for counterinsurgency because of the “increased discrimination in time, 
manner, and targeting not available via any other comparable weapon platform.”212  
Anderson states that because ground forces are not in imminent danger, there is no need 
for rushed decisions on the use of force.  The long loiter time of drones coupled with their 
ISR collection capabilities facilitates gaining more fidelity on a target in order to make a 
decision on what to do next. 
 Furthermore, Anderson addresses the question on whether or not drone strikes 
“make it more difficult for ground forces attempting to carry out a hearts-and-minds 
campaign to win over the local population.”213  The thought being that drone strikes 
cause too many civilian casualties, consequently increasing recruitment for an 
insurgency.  But Anderson’s claim to the causal relationship between drone strikes and 
recruitment states it is “contingent and uncertain.”214  Daniel Byman addresses questions 
that drones “kill today’s enemies but creates tomorrow’s in the process” by indicating the 
lack of concrete evidence of the relationship.215  Generally speaking, there seems to be a 
lack of concrete evidence behind a relationship between drone strikes and joining an 
insurgency. 
 However, there are multiple assessments on what drives someone to join to fight.  
With respect to Pakistan, Byman down plays the causal relationship and questions the 
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bias of the polls conducted, the nature of how conclusive the results are, and the point 
that most of the targets of drone strikes are enemies of Pakistan.216  On a larger scale, 
Kilcullen concedes, “many members of the global jihad are related by birth or marriage… 
sons of jihadists often follow their fathers and widows often avenge their husbands by 
becoming suicide bombers.”217  His approach asserts a more familial position in some 
regard.  In either case, Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that might not matter as much 
because the real issue is that “the United States is losing the war of perceptions, a key 
part of any counterterrorism campaign.”218  Whether or not drones are causing more 
adversaries than they are eliminating appears to remain inconclusive. 
 Despite the evidence in establishing a clear relationship between drone strikes and 
recruitment for an insurgency, Anderson takes on the claim of comparing collateral 
damage in military operations.  He states that if any force is to be used then collateral 
damage will be inevitable.  Conversely, if the situation does not allow for force to be 
used, “then any civilian death by drones is excessive.”219  Comparing the degree of 
civilian casualties in a kinetic CT strategy to a non-kinetic strategy [read: COIN] that 
does not include force of any kind is not practical.220  In other words, once it is 
determined that CT should be confronted with physical force civilian casualties are an 
unfortunate consequence.  Therefore, the method of kinetic action against CT should 
involve the method that produces the least amount of collateral damage.  Anderson posits 
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that drones have been able to meet that challenge, not flawlessly, but with great 
improvements on civilian casualties.221 
 Using counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in the correct context should drive 
how the use of force is applied.  This enables a more appropriate use of drones and if 
things go wrong, it places the emphasis on the goals of the mission and not an inanimate 
object.  Intelligence collection may be the ideal role in a counterinsurgency, while kinetic 
strikes missions take the lead in counterterrorism operations.  On the other hand, COIN 
and CT operations benefit from a weapon system capable of both intelligence and strike 
capabilities when used appropriately. 
 
Case Study 
 This case study will examine the use of drones, and more specifically armed 
drones, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.  The aim of this case study is to determine 
if drones are more beneficial to counterinsurgency or counterterrorist missions.  The 
evidence suggests there are benefits to both, but also repercussions if they are used 
disproportionately or sparingly.  These countries were chosen because of their uniqueness 
in highlighting the influence of drones by the United States as it uses force in prosecuting 
its targets.  The application of force to conduct a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism 
mission is a central component of what is at stake here.  Pakistan provides an example of 
where counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations seem to be conducted 
concurrently.  By contrast, Yemen provides an example of armed drones supporting 
counterterrorism operations without a significant number of American ground forces and 
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Afghanistan underscores the judicious use of force as it largely pertains to a 
counterinsurgency mission.222 
 
Drone Use in Pakistan 
 Armed drones in Pakistan are used to pursue an enemy seeking refuge there.  
Enemy forces attack Coalition forces in Afghanistan and then move into Pakistan, outside 
the traditional reach of Coalition forces.  Targets are generally in Pakistan’s North and 
South Waziristan provinces under the control of Taliban groups.223  Essentially, the 
Taliban, either through tacit approval or endorsement of the Pakistani government, 
created a “state-within-a-state” in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).224  
These are home to some of the most dangerous groups such that it constitutes “one of the 
greatest threats to American domestic security.”225  Furthermore, this sanctuary is said to 
be home to al-Qaeda plotting new attacks against the United States.226 
 To deny refuge in the safe havens of the un-governed FATA, the United States, 
according to the DoD definition, does not appear to be addressing the “root causes” of the 
war, but rather taking the counterterrorist approach and taking “action directly against 
terrorist networks.”227  This is done generally through directly targeting the senior 
leadership and through targeting the physical and behavioral characteristics of an 
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individual or group of people.228  The latter of which is referred to as “signature 
strikes.”229  Although the number of airstrikes is not divided out to identify which strikes 
are more choreographed and deliberate and which ones are signature strikes, the greater 
the level of target fidelity appears to take on the traits of what a counterinsurgency strike 
would look like.  While signature strikes seem to be counterterrorist in nature by striking 
to combat a force where there is no time to sort out each individual in the area. 
 The Long War Journal indicates 363 airstrikes were conducted in Pakistan from 
2004 through September 2014, 352 of which occurred from 2008 through September 
2014.230  The damage assessment from these strikes since 2006 killed “2,647 leaders and 
operatives from Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and allied extremist groups.”231  The impact of these 
attacks has contributed to the loss of safe haven for these extremist groups and 
consequently decreased the ability for al-Qaeda and like groups to plan future attacks.232  
However, these attacks also killed 156 civilians.233  The evidence suggests that from a 
counterterrorist perspective, to use force expeditiously, these statistics may seem to be a 
success, but in a counterinsurgency, where force is used judiciously, 156 killed civilians 
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Drone Use in Yemen 
 By contrast, in Yemen, from 2002 until September 2014, 103 airstrikes were 
conducted resulting in the death of 498 al-Qaeda and affiliates and 105 civilians.234  The 
Yemen strikes produced more than three times the number of civilian casualties by 
comparison – approximately five and a half percent of the total casualties were civilians 
in Pakistan, and nearly eighteen percent in Yemen.  This is an important figure because 
where a counterterrorist policy might be implied in Yemen, collateral damage may have a 
higher threshold. 
 Despite the criticism President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi received due to high 
collateral damage from airstrikes, he “remained a strong U.S. counterterrorism partner in 
2013.”235  Hadi is fighting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as they make an 
aggressive campaign to control parts of Yemen from which to plan attacks against the 
United States.236  As a result, Hadi has partnered with the United States to support drone 
strikes and accepted support in the form of “intelligence, logistics, weapons, 
ammunition” to enhance the Yemeni military and security forces in combating AQAP.237  
A strong counterterrorist partner to the United States, the Yemeni government is also 
working to employ soft power.  As AQAP takes the approach of “orchestrating a prolific 
insurgency” against the government, the Yemeni government is developing stability 
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operations.238  To that end, the Yemeni government is pursuing counter radicalization 
programs for “rehabilitation and reintegration” of the government’s adversaries.239  Thus, 
the Yemeni government is addressing the “root causes” of terrorism within its borders, 
while also permitting drones and other uses of force to counteract terrorism directly. 
 
Drone Use in Afghanistan 
 In Afghanistan, a fairly clear counterinsurgency mission against the Taliban, the 
use of force is heavily scrutinized.240  General McChrystal, in cautioning about the use of 
force sparingly and proportionally states, “air power contains the seeds of our own 
destruction if we do not use it responsibly.”241  After a significant loss of civilian life 
from manned aircraft, a clear message was needed to assure the Afghan government and 
people that the use of force would be applied more proportionately, and with more 
precision.242  To be sure, United States troops were required to weigh the use of force “to 
protect their troops” while also ensuring the safety of the civilian population.243  In other 
words, the counterinsurgency mission dictates that the safety of the civilian population 
and the reputation of the Afghan government are important considerations while pursuing 
the adversary. 
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 Indeed, through proper use, drones in Afghanistan are in part one of the ways to 
reduce civilian casualties under a counterinsurgency model pursued by military 
commanders.244  The primary function of drones in Afghanistan appears to be for 
intelligence collection, with strike capabilities as a collateral benefit.  General 
McChrystal remarked on the intelligence collection capabilities of drones as 
“extraordinarily effective” in a dynamic environment.245  With respect to the use of force 
by drones, General Mueller stated the role of drones in the counterinsurgency strategy 
“isn’t about going out and finding” insurgents, but when they do find them, strike 
capabilities are leveraged.246  A more measured use of drones in Afghanistan to support 
ground forces conducting counterinsurgency operations is an example of an effective use. 
 
Mixed Messaging on the Use of Force 
 In Pakistan, the mission seems to be less clear.  The Pakistani government has 
allowed the use of drone strikes in some instances, but publicly lashed out against them in 
other settings.  As discussed in Chapter One, former President Zardari had a careless 
attitude to the amount of civilian casualties caused by targeting al-Qaeda by saying, “Kill 
the seniors.  Collateral damage worries you Americans.  It does not worry me.”247  As 
callous as it may seem, perhaps Zardari’s approach is more reflective of the 
counterterrorism perspective in that once the use of force was determined to be the 
appropriate response to combat militant extremists in the FATA, collateral damage was 
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an inevitable outcome.  Otherwise, his position seems to be far more damaging than 
would be the perception of drone strikes.  However, Zardari also claims drone strikes 
“result in loss of precious lives” and are “counterproductive” and create a “credibility 
gap.”248  Zardari’s attempt to restore credibility in his government’s ability to deal with 
the threat is akin to the principles of counterinsurgency.  Shirking off collateral damage 
would be directly at odds with the principles of a counterinsurgency by not protecting his 
population.  This is an ideal example of trying to use drones to achieve two separate 
missions – counterterrorist and counterinsurgency. 
 In what appears to be in retaliation for the deadly attack on the international 
airport in Karachi in June 2014, Pakistan asked the United States for help and granted, 
“express approval” for drone strikes to target those responsible for the attacks.249  Such 
approval shows when there is a clear benefit to attacking an adversary in an inhospitable 
area such as the FATA, drones are very effective, even from a country that has been very 
critical of drone use. They are an effective weapon system against an enemy in austere 
and remote locations. 
 The government of Pakistan seems to be culpable of the mixed emotions felt by 
its population on the use of drones by endorsing strikes that effectively eliminate senior 
leadership without civilian casualties, then condemning them when there is public outcry 
over civilian casualties.  If drones violate state sovereignty, thereby undermining the role 
of the central government, the outcome of the strike is immaterial.  While civilian 
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casualties may exacerbate the negativity, successful strikes should not be heralded as a 
victory, but rather another violation of sovereignty. 
 The way these terms are being used synonymously could impact the way drones 
can support counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations.  Armed-drone strikes in a 
counterterrorist mission, such as in Pakistan, could cause backlash among locals making 
it more difficult to counter an insurgency.  On the other hand, not leveraging the strike 
capability of drones in a counterterrorist mission, because of the lack of target fidelity, 
could further delay successful counterterrorist missions by not striking the enemy when 
feasible.  In either case, the emphasis has to be placed on how the use of force should be 
applied to achieve the mission – to counter an insurgency by bolstering the central 
government, or through an aggressive counterterrorist campaign, under which the priority 
is to target the network. 
 
Analysis 
 Debating the semantics is more than perfunctory, as speaking in a common 
language removes the ambiguity as to what the mission is supposed to achieve.  Properly 
classifying an enemy is paramount in determining how to defeat the enemy.  An 
insurgent force using terrorism tactics or a terrorist group inciting an insurgency “does 
not make them fundamentally equivalent or susceptible to the same remedies.”250  The 
use of force is applied differently.  An airstrike, from a manned or unmanned aerial 
vehicle, is still an airstrike.  A target is identified, a missile is launched, and there is an 
explosion on the ground.  However, the evidence suggests the difference is how much 
thought is given to what happens next and who was at the receiving end of the strike.  
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Second and third order effects may be measured in a CT strike, but in a COIN strike they 
must be a primary factor.  Furthermore, the level of fidelity on the intended target must 
also be of paramount concern in a COIN strike so as not to further the chasm between the 
insurgent force and central government. 
 This is not to assert that the lack of target fidelity in a CT strike is good, but rather 
the evidence suggests in a CT mission the focus is directly on an enemy via kinetic 
action.  Whereas, a COIN mission dictates the use of force to be more “choreographed.”  
To be sure, in Afghanistan, General McChrystal curtailed the use of force, specifically 
airpower, to reduce civilian casualties, thereby protecting the population from collateral 
damage.  Thus, this restored the “legitimacy” of the Afghan central government as an 
able bodied instrument of power to protect its people.  Whether this decision was made at 
the behest of the Afghan government or the United States government, or that it was the 
right thing to do (reduce collateral damage), is immaterial because the outcome was the 
same – to restore faith in the central government and protect the population. 
 On the other hand, more indiscriminate targeting practices, such as “signature 
strikes,” can cause instability by targeting groups of people characteristically or 
behaviorally displaying a threat without exact knowledge of who they are.  Such 
operations jeopardize the goals of a more “choreographed” use of force in COIN, but 
they do have their place in CT.  In Yemen, where AQAP threatens the stability of the 
government and actively pursues control of terrain, the government has partnered with 
the United States to leverage airpower and push back the terrorist group.  Additionally, 
the United States is engaged in providing material support to Yemeni security forces.  
However, Yemen is far from a success story.  If AQAP successfully incites a “prolific 
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insurgency,” the Yemeni government may have to relook its endorsement of American 
airpower if the levels of collateral damage do not drop.251 
 The approach to Pakistan seems to favor a more counterterrorist approach 
whereby perceptions of stability of the Pakistani government is subordinate to the 
primary goal of targeting the adversary.  The number of airstrikes in Pakistan, without 
United States ground forces there, suggests these strikes are used as an offensive 
operation solely to attrite the enemy – something COIN experts have cautioned against 
when applying airpower in COIN operations.  Where ground forces are present, drones 
not only conduct strike missions, but also support defensive or force protection 
operations.  The absence of United States ground forces in Pakistan to protect, further 
supports a more CT role of drones in Pakistan.  To be sure, the raid on Osama bin 
Laden’s compound also suggests CT plays a larger role in the strategy toward enemies 
located within Pakistan. 
 By contrast, the government of Pakistan, despite its approval for drone strikes and 
hosting airbases, from which drones are launched, makes allegations that their use is 
“counterproductive” and an affront to the sovereignty of Pakistan, therefore creating a 
“legitimacy gap.”252  However, Pakistan likely takes this approach because they are 
confronted with their own challenge of “struggling to deal with its stubborn militancy 
problem.”253  It stands to reason that the Pakistani government is sensitive to public 
opinion of drone strikes as they employ missions to strengthen the legitimacy of their 
central government, but also to combat its enemies within the state.  If Pakistanis view 
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drones as a violation of state sovereignty, that would make their government seem weak 
and vulnerable.  A counterinsurgency mission is likely more appropriate for the 
Pakistanis to conduct within their own country.  However, this approach would mean 
President Mamnoon Hussain would have to stay clear from making the assertions Zardari 
did about civilian casualties. 
 However, United States CT-based missions in Pakistan do not appear to mutually 
support the Pakistani’s conducting their own COIN mission.  By chance there will be 
mutual benefits, for example when a drone strike only kills known insurgents or terrorists 
that pose a threat to Pakistanis, without causing collateral damage.  But if Pakistanis view 
drones as an affront to their sovereignty, all strikes should be viewed in the same manner, 
despite the outcome of the strike.  Indeed, drones have the potential to cause collateral 
damage.  As with any facet of armed warfare, when the use of force is chosen to stop an 
aggressor, collateral damage is an unfortunate consequence.  The Pakistanis cannot have 
it both ways – support when it works and then outright rejection of the very idea when it 
does not. 
   Drones appear to be able to support COIN operations through persistent ISR 
collection.  A high level of fidelity can be achieved in order to ensure it is the right target 
and if force is decided to be used, they can chose a moment to strike when there is no risk 
of collateral damage.  Furthermore, drones remove the need for ground forces, which can 
be another contributing factor to the instability on the ground.  On the other hand, as the 
evidence suggests, the use of airpower in a counterinsurgency, such as in Afghanistan, 
should be used in measured amounts and only after alternatives are deemed unsuitable. 
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 By contrast, drones also appear to have their place in CT missions, because they 
are a reliable offensive measure against a terrorist network.  In places like North 
Waziristan, Pakistan, drones have been able to enter inhospitable environments to target 
adversaries seeking refuge.  Similarly, in Yemen they have been an integral part in 
combating AQAP without placing ground forces in harms way.  As a weapon in CT 
missions, the evidence suggests drones have been successful in removing adversaries 
from the battlefield. 
 Differentiating between a counterterrorist and counterinsurgent strategy seems to 
be the crux of the issue in determining if and what level of force is to be used.  
Nevertheless, drones appear relevant in being able to support either counterterrorist or 
counterinsurgent operations.  In order to ensure the use of force is consistent with the 
principles of its mission, the type of mission will have to be identified first.  Based on the 
evidence presented in this chapter, leveraging the benefits of armed unmanned aerial 
vehicles should be carefully measured with how the use of force should be applied to 
ensure the goals of the overall strategy are what drive the use of drones. 
 
Conclusion 
 After thirteen years in Afghanistan and almost half that in Iraq simultaneously, 
the United States government and military leaders alike understandably seek to leverage 
the best parts of both COIN and CT – to stabilize the host nation’s government to prevent 
further insurgencies, while dealing swift defeat to the enemies of the United States.  
However, adopting one strategy [COIN] to achieve the goals of the other [CT] is unclear 
and ineffective.  The lack of clarity could result in the misplacement of blame if things go 
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wrong.  Claiming that drones are counterproductive assumes there is a clear, or at least 
common, goal that one can achieve.  Drones have many benefits well outside their use as 
an armed weapon, such as their intelligence collection capability.  To say drones cause 
too many civilian casualties or challenge state sovereignty misplaces culpability and 
overlooks how the use of force was to be applied. 
 The lack of a conclusive study with evidence detracts from a definitive answer on 
a causal relationship of drone strikes resulting in additional people joining an insurgency 
or terrorist group.  Further research could enhance the fidelity on the relationship between 
the two.   
 Leaders in stressful situations look for the best options to support decisions that 
achieve desired results.  Drones not only provide kinetic strike options, but also enhance 
target knowledge.  Sometimes the decision is made from the best of the worst options 
available, but they are options nonetheless.  When things go wrong, culpability should 
rest with the inaccurate application of the use of force, not on an inanimate object.  




 Airpower has long been used as an implement of coercion to get an enemy to 
change its behavior, with varying degrees of success.254  At the time of this writing, the 
United States is using its airpower, among other elements of national power, to confront 
the group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northern Iraq.  American airstrikes 
have had some successes in reinforcing the Kurds, but airpower alone is not projected to 
be the “decisive factor” in combating ISIS.  On the other hand, airstrikes have enabled 
ground forces to regain the initiative, and “buoyed the spirits of the fighters” on the 
ground while providing some setbacks to the enemy.255 
 However, airstrikes alone, from manned or unmanned aircraft, are not likely able 
to achieve the long-term strategy.  Ground forces will have to be part of that larger plan.  
Occupying terrain is something ground forces have done for centuries.  Despite the 
gravitation to technological advancements, in the words of Max Boot, “when it comes to 
reinforcing regime change, there is still no replacement for a rifleman on a street 
corner.”256  For their part, UAVs provide tactical advantages and motivate ground forces, 
but decisive victory will come from more sweeping change in the political landscape 
reinforced by ground forces securing the terrain.  Airpower, in the shape of drone strikes, 
is effective at targeting individuals, but is unable to eradicate complete terrorist 
organizations.257 
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 For all the benefits of drones, the evidence suggests they will not be able to 
achieve the same strategic objectives as ground forces.  In the case of the United States’ 
support in Mali, unarmed drones were supporting a larger ground campaign led by 
French and Malian forces.  In the case of fighting ISIS in northern Iraq, and Syria to 
some extent, airstrikes are supporting Kurdish ground forces.  The difference in these two 
examples challenges the argument that drones make it easy to go to war (jus ad bellum).  
In the case against ISIS, these are armed strikes from drones and fighter jets.258  Airpower 
was used to facilitate regaining the initiative of Kurdish ground forces by suppressing the 
firepower of ISIS.  On the other hand, in Mali, unarmed drones were used to support the 
ground battle.  Drones were not directly engaging in armed combat, but rather providing 
intelligence collection support for ground forces.  This is an important distinction to make 
because this highlights unmanned aerial vehicles as a way to support a larger ground 
conflict without exposing Americans to the dangers of war.  Had an American soldier 
been killed, or taken hostage, in the Malian conflict, that may have changed the level of 
armed support entirely.  Drones provided the option to support the conflict without 
directly increasing the risk to American forces and without conducting an armed act of 
aggression.  
 Armed drones endure the brunt of the arguments against their use from the level 
of collateral damage.  However, more evidence is needed on the number of civilian 
casualties caused by drones and to fully understand the relationship between drone strikes 
fueling an insurgency or terrorist organizations.  Furthermore, more clearly defining the 
mission of armed UAVs will enable a more defendable position regarding what level of 
collateral damage is acceptable. 
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 In a CT mission, defining individuals in the close proximity of known al-Qaeda as 
collateral damage is fairly unclear at times because, as Byman states, ”al-Qaeda is an 
insular, paranoid organization – innocent neighbors don’t hitchhike rides in the back of 
trucks headed for the border with guns and bombs.”259  Byman makes an interesting point 
in terms of the likelihood that someone that close to an al-Qaeda operative is likely al-
Qaeda too.  This assertion highlights the fine line between collateral damage and guilty 
by association.  Although this is an interesting point to make, and the evidence may 
support the majority of the time the unknown individual is indeed an al-Qaeda operative, 
there is also evidence to suggest it is not a perfect solution. 
 For example, a Yemeni schoolteacher, who by all accounts was not an al-Qaeda 
operative, did stop to offer individuals a ride in the back of his pickup truck.260  Moments 
later the vehicle was struck from the air and killed all the vehicle’s occupants.  The death 
of an innocent and respected member of a community challenges the blanket acceptance 
of armed intervention and could cause some to resent the manner with which terrorists 
are neutralized. 
 However, for each anecdote that could cause someone to join a militant group, it 
appears that there is another story of strong support for American intervention in 
combatting AQAP.  In April 2014, two American officials in Yemen defended 
themselves from an apparent kidnapping by killing the two AQAP operatives.261  They 
were hailed as heroes from a Yemeni eyewitness, because he thought, “Yemenis needed 
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9, 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1745/opinion/3332/US-drone-attacks-in-Yemen-protect-no-one-
but-Al-Qaeda.htm.  Multiple sources indicate that the schoolteacher was not involved with al-Qaeda.  It is 
unclear if weapons were present in this instance. 
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that lesson.”262  Although, this does not directly support Western drone use in Yemen, 
this is important nonetheless because it does show some Yemenis may support 
eradicating terrorists from their land.  In other words, had collateral damage been 
inflicted, it does not imply one would resort to a lifetime of militant extremism (e.g. join 
al-Qaeda) against the United States.  Given the polarity in anecdotes, more research is 
needed to make definitive conclusions about the causal relationship between collateral 
damage from drone strikes and fueling an insurgency or causing some to join a terrorist 
group. 
 To that end, determining the strategies of the conflict will play a crucial role in 
determining how the use of force is applied from drones.  This is important due to the 
increased use of UAVs.  Drones are effective CT weapons because they can pursue 
enemies of the United States in hard to reach places while avoiding boots on the ground.  
Drones also support COIN missions through their ability to provide persistent and 
uninterrupted coverage of a target over long periods of time for intelligence collection 
purposes or, if the environment is suitable, for a kinetic strike. 
 The ease with which some targets can be engaged is therefore the driver behind 
the need for a transparent policy on the use of force via drones.  Drones require a 
transparent policy to structure its use and to prevent the United States from entering into 
conflicts because it is easy.  Zenko’s recommendation for adjusting policies guiding the 
use of drones is that the President should restrict the use of drone strikes to only al-Qaeda 
senior leadership or individuals known to be part of an operation against the United 
States or its allies is a step in the right direction.263  Absent clear data on the causal 
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relationship of drone strikes and increasing the ranks of enemy fighters, this is an ideal 
situation to curb the arguments about the level of collateral damage, while ensuring the 
security of the United States is preserved. 
 Admittedly, there are shortcomings of this thesis and there is room for future 
research to refine these conclusions.  To begin with, some of the assertions made within 
this thesis are based on data of drone strikes and the amount of civilian casualties caused 
by the strikes.  This has some complications in that the data itself may have some 
inconsistencies in how a civilian is defined.  Miscounting civilian casualties could change 
the analysis behind the use of force in certain missions.  Furthermore, a question to ask is, 
what alternatives are there to pursue the enemies of the United States in hard to reach 
places?  The unfortunate truth in this matter is that upsetting some local tribesmen in the 
hinter regions of Pakistan or Yemen is likely better than letting al-Qaeda and Taliban 
fighters run free.  Or is it? 
 Questions to guide further research could take the form of, is the United States 
relying on the utility of UAVs too much?  Will policy decisions seek the light footprint 
approach before overwhelming decisive force is used?  If so, are there any consequences? 
If the risk of the mission is not worth the risk to a human, should the United States enter 
into the operation?  This is an interesting question because it does not mean that drones 
cannot be used in lieu of ground forces, but that could be the test to determine if the 
target is worth prosecuting. 
 The premise that, “drone strikes are the best worst option for dealing with a hard 
to reach enemy,” requires that this use does not precipitate into an over-extension of the 
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United States flexing an element of national power because it can.264  As a natural 
progression of a technologically superior military, UAVs have proven to be a reliable and 
dependable intelligence collection platform with a strike capability; however, they are no 
substitute for human engagement on the ground, and require a clear and unambiguous 
mission to guide the use of force by the unmanned system. 
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